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THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “GOD”: 
USING THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
FRAMING GENERATION TO CREATE  
A COHERENT ESTABLISHMENT  
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
MICHAEL I. MEYERSON* 
The Supreme Court’s attempt to create a standard for evaluating whether the 
Establishment Clause is violated by religious governmental speech, such as the 
public display of the Ten Commandments or the Pledge of Allegiance, is a total 
failure.  The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been termed 
“convoluted,” “a muddled mess,” and “a polite lie.”  Unwilling to either allow all 
governmental religious speech or ban it entirely, the Court is in need of a 
coherent standard for distinguishing the permissible from the unconstitutional.  
Thus far, no Justice has offered such a standard. 
A careful reading of the history of the framing period reveals that those 
responsible for the initial implementation of the First Amendment were able to 
create a compromise that permitted the use of governmental religious speech in a 
way that was inclusive of all citizens, regardless of faith.  Committed to creating 
an “American” vision of religious freedom, one that was distinct from the 
restrictive practices of the individual states, George Washington, Thomas 
Jefferson, and James Madison created a new template for public religious 
vocabulary.  Through the use of non-sectarian, theologically equivocal language, 
they found a way to talk simultaneously to the most orthodox segment of the 
population and atheists, deists, and other members of religious minorities. 
My Article proposes building on the lessons of the framing period to create a 
workable Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  If we accept that non-sectarian 
phrases such as “endowed by their Creator” need not divide our nation, we can 
modify the traditional “endorsement test.”  A workable test reflecting the 
Framers’ wisdom would only judge governmental speech as unconstitutional if it 
endorsed religion in such a way “that it sends a message to nonadherents that 
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of 
the political community.”  Simple non-sectarian utterances, such as the Supreme 
Court’s invocation “God save the United States and this honorable court,” would 
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the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
 1036 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1035 
be permitted, while the courthouse display of the Ten Commandments would be 
prohibited, and judges and lawyers would finally be able to rely on a usable, 
understandable Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has never figured out how to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the myriad religious references that pervade 
American public life.  The Court seemingly alternates between ad hoc, 
one-case-at-a-time jurisprudence and prudential avoidance of the 
constitutional issue altogether.  The result has been confusion for 
government officials, a lack of guidance for lower courts, and 
unsympathetic disrespect by many of those who study the Court.1 
The fundamental problem for the Court arises from the fact that it 
has been unwilling to either prohibit all governmental religious speech 
(such as the national motto, “In God we trust,” and the phrase, “one 
nation under God,” in the Pledge of Allegiance) or permit all 
governmental religious speech (such as placing the Ten Commandments 
in a school or courthouse).  Thus, the Court is left with the difficult task 
of articulating the line between permissible and unconstitutional 
religious governmental speech.  As Douglas Laycock noted, 
It is easy to explain why government can never say anything 
about religion, and equally easy (though less convincing) to 
explain why government can say anything it wants about religion 
so long as it does not coerce or penalize those who disagree.  
Avoiding either extreme requires the Court to pick and choose, 
to explain why government can endorse some religious 
 
1.  See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, Prayer in Governmental Institutions: The Who, the 
What, and the at Which Level, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 299, 326 (2001) (“[A] healthy dose of 
gastronomical jurisprudence enters the arena.  We know in our guts that the Supreme Court 
will not require government to remove the references to God from the national motto or the 
pledge of allegiance.  But, we stumble uncertainly in searching for a convincing rationale to 
support that position.”); RonNell Andersen Jones, Pick Your Poison: Private Speech, 
Government Speech, and the Special Problem of Religious Displays, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2045, 
2046 (“All told, the Supreme Court’s handling of purportedly sectarian displays has been 
convoluted at best.”); Bruce Ledewitz, Could Government Speech Endorsing a Higher Law 
Resolve the Establishment Clause Crisis?, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 41, 47 (2009) (“Public religious 
displays and imagery are routinely upheld by the courts, but without convincing 
explanation.”); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”: Reconstructing the 
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1003 (1989) (“When the Court wishes to 
invalidate a law or practice, it implicitly adopts an exclusionary approach; finding religious 
content or inspiration, the Court pronounces the law or practice unconstitutional.  When the 
Court wishes to uphold a law or practice, it adopts an inclusive or positive conception of the 
secular; almost any measure enacted by a state or national legislature will survive that test.”). 
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propositions but not others, with no clear principle to guide the 
choices.2 
One of the major reasons the Court has not had a “clear principle” 
to guide its Establishment Clause cases is that the Justices have 
fundamentally misunderstood the history of the words and actions of 
those who helped create the First Amendment.  The Framers are 
assumed to have wanted either a “‘high and impregnable’ wall between 
church and state”3 or a nation in which the national government could 
encourage citizens to attend a particular church as long as no 
governmental coercion was involved.4  The Framers are said to have 
been interested in furthering either only monotheism5 or only 
Christianity.6 
The error in these interpretations is that they treat the Framers as 
simplistic, narrow-minded partisans.  In reality, the Framers constructed 
a sophisticated compromise.  They recognized the important distinction 
between governmental action and governmental speech.  The federal 
government was considered virtually prohibited from regulating or 
funding religious activities.7  But genuine, devout governmental 
religious speech was to be permitted, within carefully delimited bounds.  
The Framers found language that expressed reverential concepts 
without implying that those not of a favored religion were second-class 
citizens.8  They avoided sectarian references, but they were not afraid of 
 
2.  Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Comment: Theology 
Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but 
Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 223–24 (2004). 
3.  Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)). 
4.  “The Framers understood an establishment ‘necessarily [to] involve actual legal 
coercion.’”  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration 
in original) (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment)). 
5.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
6.  Id. at 880 (majority opinion). 
7.  In 1811, for example, James Madison vetoed a law that would have granted “five 
acres of land, including Salem Meeting-house, in the Mississippi Territory, for the use of the 
Baptist Church.”  22 ANNALS OF CONG. 1097–98, 1104 (1811).  The Baptist church had 
requested the land because, after erecting the church building, it discovered that the structure 
was on federal property.  Unable to obtain clear title to the property, the church petitioned 
Congress.  Madison’s veto message declared that this grant would violate the Establishment 
Clause by setting a “precedent, for the appropriation of funds of the United States, for the 
use and support of religious societies.”  Id. at 1097–98. 
8.  See infra Part V.A. 
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the public offering of truly religious expression.  They strove to create a 
civil vocabulary that could encompass all people, regardless of their 
faith. 
Their means for accomplishing this difficult feat was the deliberate 
use of theologically equivocal language.  The best-known example is the 
Declaration of Independence’s use of “endowed by their Creator,” 
which can be seen by the devout as pious religious language but can be 
heard by non-believers in a variety of other ways.  By contrast, the 
Framers avoided sectarian language, as well as governmental directives 
that the citizenry pray.  Following the path of the Framers, we can 
create a twenty-first century standard for evaluating which religious 
governmental speech is consistent with the Establishment Clause. 
It is important to emphasize that emulating the Framers in this area 
does not require commitment to the “originalist” school of 
constitutional interpretation.9  One need not believe that, when 
interpreting the Constitution, “we must be guided by [its] original 
meaning, . . . [that what] . . . it meant when adopted, it means now.”10  It 
is possible to agree that both Bolling v. Sharpe11 and United States v. 
Virginia12 were correctly decided, notwithstanding the certainty that the 
Framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments did not intend their 
amendments to provide equality for African-Americans and women. 
One can also agree that, “[d]espite more than forty years of criticism 
by the historical academy, ‘bad history’ abounds in Religion Clause 
jurisprudence.”13  Far too many judicial and scholarly opinions that 
purport to rely on the founding period are in reality nothing more than 
“‘law office’ history,” that is, “the selection of data favorable to the 
 
9.  Originalism “most often refers to the normative constitutional interpretive theory 
that instructs judges faced with indeterminate textual guidance to look primarily to the 
original understanding of a particular clause’s ratifying generation.”  Jamal Greene, Selling 
Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 662 (2009); see also Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A 
Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377 (2013) (“[O]riginalism argues that the 
discoverable public meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption should be 
regarded as authoritative for purposes of later constitutional interpretation.”). 
10.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 
(1905)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
11.  347 U.S. 497 (1954) (banning racial segregation in schools under federal 
jurisdiction). 
12.  518 U.S. 515 (1996) (requiring that women be admitted to the Virginia Military 
Institute). 
13.  Steven K. Green, “Bad History”: The Lure of History in Establishment Clause 
Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1717, 1719 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
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position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory 
data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered.”14 
We can also accept the observation that, even if the study of history 
is honestly pursued and well-researched, it cannot be expected to 
“provide specific answers to modern controversies.”15  History can, 
however, “provide the perimeters within which the choice of meaning 
may be made.”16  It can “inform; it cannot resolve legal controversies.”17   
In the area of freedom of religion, in particular, the practices of the 
founding generation can “shine light upon the meaning of the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.”18  Founders such as George 
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison thought deeply 
about the meaning of liberty of conscience and also about the painful 
history of governmental involvement with religion.  Unlike their 
antiquated views on issues like race and gender, the Framers had a 
sophisticated understanding of religious freedom that is surprisingly 
modern.  They knew that religion could be a source of both incredible 
good or incredible evil, and they were committed to finding ways in 
which religion could unite, rather than divide, the new nation.  We need 
not follow the Framers in this area because we want to “return to the 
days” of the founding period.19  Rather, we should learn from their 
experience to ensure that the Establishment Clause protects their hard-
won vision of an American theory of freedom of religion. 
This Article is organized as follows.  Part II explores the historical 
origins of some of the most iconic examples of governmental religious 
 
14.  Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 
122 n.13; see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION 
AND GOVERNMENT 787 n.3 (2d ed. 2001) (“[T]here is a tendency to refer the reader to pages 
in the cited volume that appear to bolster the Court’s conclusion, and to ignore other 
materials in the same volume that cast doubt on the Court’s reading of the past.”); Jack N. 
Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1591 (1997) (“We 
can think of the role that appeals to history play in the composition of judicial opinions not as 
the reasons driving decisions, but as an attractive rhetorical method of reassuring citizens that 
courts are acting consistently with deeply held values.”). 
15.  Green, supra note 13, at 1719. 
16.  Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 839, 841–42 (1986).   
17.  Green, supra note 13, at 1719. 
18.  Mark David Hall, Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court’s 
Use of History in Religion Clause Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 563, 567 (2006). 
19.  Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2155 (1996). 
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expression.  Part III discusses the hopelessly confused state of modern 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Part IV examines the historical 
record and demonstrates the Framers’ sophisticated compromise.  Part 
V explores how a modern standard can be derived from the lessons of 
our founding period. 
II. RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 
For a nation without established religion, there exists a seemingly 
endless array of religious governmental pronouncements.20  On both the 
national and local level, through statutes, proclamations, and informal 
practices, religion plays a major role in how government communicates 
with the citizenry.  Any attempt to create a workable jurisprudence for 
evaluating these statements and activities must begin by recognizing the 
many different ways that America’s governments utilize religious 
utterances. 
A. “God save the United States and this honorable Court” 
At the time the Constitution was ratified, the state courts of New 
England generally opened with a sectarian prayer offered by local 
clergy.21  The original Supreme Court Justices “rode the circuits” and 
heard cases throughout the new nation.22  When sitting in New England, 
the Justices followed the local custom of beginning court sessions with a 
prayer.  John Jay, the first Chief Justice, wrote of his plans for sitting in 
the “Northern Circuit”: “It appears to me adviseable to respect ancient 
usages in all Cases where Deviations from them are not of essential 
Importance. . . .  The custom in New England of a clergyman’s 
 
20.  See, e.g., LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT, at xiv (2d ed. rev. 1994) (“[R]eligion saturates American public life.”); 
Ashley M. Bell, Comment, “God Save This Honorable Court”: How Current Establishment 
Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical Religious 
Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (2001) (“Historical religious expressions are 
deeply embedded in various aspects of public life.”).  
21.  See, e.g., Charles F. Sedgwick, Fifty Years at the Litchfield County Bar (1870), in 
DWIGHT C. KILBOURN, THE BENCH AND BAR OF LITCHFIELD COUNTY, CONNECTICUT 
1709–1909, at 75 (1909) (“It had been the practice of the Congregational pastor of the village, 
to open the proceedings in Court with prayer . . . .”). 
22.  “The Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . required Justices to ride circuit, which involved 
traveling from state to state in order to hold circuit court in each district within a circuit twice 
annually.”  David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 1710, 1715 (2007). 
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attending, should in my opinion be observed and continued.”23  A 
Boston newspaper noted that the Circuit Court for the District of 
Massachusetts 
opened on Saturday, May 12, [1792,] with Chief Justice John Jay, 
Associate Justice William Cushing, and Judge John Lowell in 
attendance.  On Monday, May 14, Jay delivered a charge to the 
grand jury . . . ‘replete with his usual perspicuity and elegance.’  
The prayer was made by the Rev. Dr. [Samuel] PARKER.”24 
Similarly, a New Hampshire newspaper reported: 
On Monday last the Circuit Court of the United States was 
opened in this town. . . .  After the Jury were empannelled, the 
Judge delivered a most elegant and appropriate Charge. . . .  
Religion & Morality were pleasingly inculcated and enforced, as 
being necessary to good government, good order and good laws, 
for “when the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice.” 
. . . . 
After the Charge was delivered, the Rev. Mr. [Timothy] 
ALDEN addressed the Throne of Grace, in an excellent, well 
adapted prayer.25 
Thus, not only was there a well-established practice of many state 
courts beginning their sessions with sectarian prayer, that practice was 
initially copied by Supreme Court Justices riding circuit.  What is so 
significant, though, is that the practice of sectarian prayer in federal 
court was obviously and unambiguously rejected by Chief Justice John 
Marshall.  Virtually nothing is known about when or why Marshall 
began opening Supreme Court sessions with the cry, “God save the 
 
23.  Letter from John Jay, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Richard 
Law, District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Mar. 10, 
1790), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789–1800, at 13, 13 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) [hereinafter 2 DHSC]. 
24.  Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts (May 12, 1792), in 2 DHSC, supra 
note 23, at 276, 276 (quoting COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, May 16, 1792, at 74). 
25.  UNITED STATES ORACLE, May 24, 1800, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 436, 436 (Maeva 
Marcus ed., 1990).  The quote “when the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice” is 
from Proverbs 29:2 (King James).  See also COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, June 8, 1793, reprinted in 
2 DHSC, supra note 23, at 406, 406 (“Judge WILSON delivered to the Grand Jury, a Charge, 
replete with the purest principles of our equal Government, and highly indicative of his legal 
reputation.  After the Charge, the Rev. Dr. THACHER addressed the throne of Grace, in 
prayer.”). 
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United States and this honorable Court.”  The earliest report is from a 
book written in 1857, about a hearing the author had attended in 1827: 
The judges were all seated, and the marshal, in a kind of nasal 
tone, cried out, “Yea, yea, yea, yea!  the Supreme Court of the 
United States is now in session.  All persons having business 
before the court will be heard.  God save the United States and 
this honorable court.”  The court was opened.  Chief Justice 
Marshal was seated in the middle, on his right were Justices 
Story, Thompson and Duval; on his left, Washington, Johnson 
and Trimble.26 
There is no reported statement of Chief Justice Marshall as to why 
he initiated the practice of a brief, non-sectarian invocation instead of a 
sectarian prayer, but that decision certainly seems to argue against using 
the invocation in support of sectarian governmental prayer and 
displays.27 
B. The National Motto   
Prior to 1956, the United States lacked a national motto.  It had been 
popularly assumed that “E Pluribus Unum—Out of many, One,” which 
has appeared on the Great Seal of the United States since 1782, was the 
national motto,28 but its status had never been made official.  
Meanwhile, on September 21, 1814, Francis Scott Key’s song, “The Star 
Spangled Banner,” declared in its fourth verse: “And this be our 
motto—‘In God is our Trust.’”29  During the Civil War, on December 9, 
 
26.  OLIVER HAMPTON SMITH, EARLY INDIANA TRIALS AND SKETCHES 137 
(Cincinnati, Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co. 1858). 
27.  For example, Justice Scalia has argued in favor of governmental displays of the Ten 
Commandments by stating, “The Supreme Court under John Marshall opened its sessions 
with the prayer, ‘God save the United States and this Honorable Court.’”  McCreary Cnty. v. 
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE 
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 469 (rev. ed. 1926)).  Similarly, Justice 
Stewart defended the practice of sectarian public school prayers by noting, “At the opening of 
each day’s Session of this Court we stand, while one of our officials invokes the protection of 
God.  Since the days of John Marshall our Crier has said, ‘God save the United States and 
this Honorable Court.’”  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(quoting 1 WARREN, supra, at 469). 
28.  1 BENSON J. LOSSING, HARPERS’ POPULAR CYCLOPÆDIA OF UNITED STATES 
HISTORY FROM THE ABORIGINAL PERIOD: CONTAINING BRIEF SKETCHES OF IMPORTANT 
EVENTS AND CONSPICUOUS ACTORS 1264 (New York, Harper & Bros. Publ’g 1892). 
29.  See generally OSCAR GEORGE THEODORE SONNECK, REPORT ON “THE STAR-
SPANGLED BANNER” “HAIL COLUMBIA” “AMERICA” “YANKEE DOODLE” 7, 37 (1909).  
His song was originally published in the Baltimore American.  Id. at 7.  It became the official 
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1863, Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase ordered the Director 
of the Mint, James Pollock, to place “In God We Trust,” on coins.30  
Congress then authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to place a 
phrase on coins31 but did not specify the particular phrase until 1873.32  
The authorization became a requirement in 1908, when Congress 
mandated that the specific phrase continue to appear on coins.33  The 
requirement was extended to all currency in 1955.34 
The following year, Congress voted to make the phrase, “In God We 
Trust” the national motto.  Citing both the National Anthem and the 
inscription on currency, the House Report declared that “it is clear that 
‘In God We Trust’ has a strong claim as our national motto.”35  The 
House Report deemed “In God We Trust” to be “superior” to “E 
Pluribus Unum,” concluding that “[i]t will be of great spiritual and 
psychological value to our country to have a clearly designated national 
motto of inspirational quality in plain, popularly accepted English.”36  
On July 30, 1956, President Eisenhower signed the law making “In God 
we trust” our national motto.37 
 
national anthem in 1931.  Act of Mar. 3, 1931, ch. 436, 46 Stat. 1508 (codified at 36 U.S.C. 
§ 301 (2012)). 
30.  DAVID K. WATSON, HISTORY OF AMERICAN COINAGE 214–15 (New York & 
London, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1899).  Earlier, Chase had written Pollock: “No nation can be 
strong except in the strength of God, or safe except in His defense.  The trust of our people in 
God should be declared on our national coins.”  Id. at 214. 
31.  Act of Apr. 22, 1864, ch. 66, 13 Stat. 54. 
32.  The Coinage Act of 1873, ch. 131, § 18, 17 Stat. 424, 427 (“[T]he director of the mint, 
with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may cause the motto ‘In God we trust’ to 
be inscribed upon such coins as shall admit of such motto; and any one of the foregoing 
inscriptions may be on the rim of the gold and silver coins.”). 
33.  Act of May 18, 1908, ch. 173, § 1, Pub. L. No. 60-120, 35 Stat. 164. 
34.  Act of July 11, 1955, ch. 303, Pub. L. No. 84-140, 69 Stat. 290.  The current 
requirement is located in two different sections: 31 U.S.C. § 5112(d)(1) (2012) (“United States 
coins shall have the inscription ‘In God We Trust.’”) and 31 U.S.C. § 5114(b) (2012) (“United 
States currency has the inscription ‘In God We Trust’ in a place the Secretary decides is 
appropriate.”).  See generally J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers’ Establishment Clause: How 
High the Wall?, 2001 BYU L. REV. 755. 
35.  H.R. REP. NO. 84-1959, at 1–2 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3720, 3720–21. 
36.  Id.; see B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and 
Change in Meaning Over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 708–09 (2010) (“[I]t was not until much 
later, in a frenzy of religious piety mixed with patriotism not unlike that accompanying the 
motto’s initial appearance in the Civil War era, that ‘In God We Trust’ was finally adopted as 
the national motto.”). 
37.  Act of July 30, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-851, 70 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 36 
U.S.C. § 302 (2012)). 
 2015] THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “GOD” 1045 
C. The Pledge of Allegiance   
The Pledge of Allegiance, without any reference to God, was written 
in 1892, by a Baptist minister’s son, Francis Bellamy, as part of a 
planned celebration of the 400th anniversary of Christopher Columbus’s 
landing in the New World.38  Printed in a very popular publication, 
Youth’s Companion, the Pledge read, “I pledge allegiance to my flag 
and the Republic for which it stands—one Nation indivisible—with 
liberty and justice for all.”39  In the 1920s, the National Flag Conference 
changed the phrase “my flag” to “the flag of the United States of 
America,” so that immigrant children would be taught that it was the 
American flag to which they were pledging allegiance.40 
During the 1930s, many states and local governments mandated the 
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools.41  In 1940, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,42 upheld 
the expulsion from public school of two Jehovah’s Witnesses, who saw 
the Pledge as a violation of their religious beliefs.43  The Court termed 
the compulsory Pledge a permissible “means to evoke that unifying 
sentiment without which there can ultimately be no liberties, civil or 
religious” and a “universal gesture of respect for the symbol of our 
national life.”44 
Two years later, in 1942, Congress enacted the first federal law 
recognizing the Pledge of Allegiance and also described the proper way 
for both civilians and the military to stand while reciting the Pledge.45  
 
38.  Jeffrey Owen Jones, The Pledge’s Creator, SMITHSONIAN, Nov. 2003, at 113, 114. 
39.  Id. at 115 (emphasis omitted). 
40.  This change happened in two intervals.  In 1923, the National Flag Conference 
changed the language to “the flag of the United States,” and the next year added, “of 
America.”  Id. at 115. 
41.  See, e.g., Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 189 A. 629, 629 (N.J. 1937) (“[E]very board of 
education in this state is obliged to procure a United States flag for each school in the district; 
the flag is to be displayed upon or near the public school building during school 
hours[,] . . . and the pupils are required to salute the flag and repeat the oath of allegiance 
every school day.” (citing Act of May 2, 1932, ch. 145, sec. 1, § 230, 1932 N.J. Laws 260)); see 
also Leoles v. Landers, 192 S.E. 218, 221 (Ga. 1937) (describing a city board of education 
requirement that all public school students “must ‘salute the flag of the United States’”). 
42.  310 U.S. 586 (1940).   
43.  Id. at 591, 597–98. 
44.  Id. at 597. 
45.  Act of June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-623, § 7, 56 Stat. 377, 380.  According to the 
law, the Pledge would be 
rendered by standing with the right hand over the heart; extending the right hand, 
palm upward, toward the flag at the words ‘to the flag’ and holding this position 
 
 1046 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1035 
Ironically, the next year, the Supreme Court reversed itself and, in West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,46 overruled Gobitis and 
said that the compulsory nature of the Pledge violated the First 
Amendment.47  Significantly, the Court did not base its decision on 
religion; the Pledge at the time contained no religious language.  
Moreover, the Court said the fact that the students’ objections to 
reciting the pledge were based on their religion was not determinative.48  
Rather, the constitutional flaw was that the government was “invad[ing] 
the sphere of intellect and spirit” by mandating that a private 
individual’s speech be in conformity with a governmental edict: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.  If there are any circumstances which permit an 
exception, they do not now occur to us.49 
Thus, Barnette is properly seen as a speech case, not a religious case.  
After that decision, local governments continued to require that public 
school teachers lead their students in the Pledge but provided that 
students who objected would be permitted to refrain from reciting the 
Pledge.50 
In 1954, Congress altered the text of the Pledge to add the words 
“under God.”51  A major goal of the sponsor of the bill was to 
differentiate the United States from its Cold War adversary, the Soviet 
 
until the end, when the hand drops to the side.  However, civilians will always show 
full respect to the flag when the pledge is given by merely standing at attention, men 
removing the headdress.  Persons in uniform shall render the military salute. 
Id. 
46.  319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
47.  Id. at 642. 
48.  Id. at 634–35. 
49.  Id. at 642. 
50.  See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 8 (2004) (“Consistent 
with our case law, the School District permits students who object on religious grounds to 
abstain from the recitation.”); Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 443 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (describing the testimony of the superintendent of schools in Wheeling, Illinois, 
that no student “is compelled to recite the Pledge, to place his hand over his heart, to stand, 
or to leave the room while others recite”). 
51.  Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249.  For an excellent history of 
the adding of “under God,” to the Pledge, see Epstein, supra note 19, at 2118–22. 
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Union.52  Others emphasized the benefits of having America’s children 
reassert a belief in God.53  The final version of the bill provided the 
version of the Pledge that has remained unchanged since: “I pledge 
allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the 
Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with 
liberty and justice for all.”54 
The recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools was 
challenged in 2004 in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,55 on 
the grounds that the addition of “under God” constituted an 
impermissible establishment of religion.56  The Supreme Court avoided 
reaching the merits of the question and ruled that the parent bringing 
the suit lacked standing.57  Several Justices, however, filed concurring 
opinions, each declaring that the public school’s recitation of the Pledge 
did not offend the Establishment Clause.58 
 
52.  100 CONG. REC. 1700 (1954) (statement of Rep. Rabaut) (“[T]he fundamental issue 
which is the unbridgeable gap between America and Communist Russia is a belief in 
Almighty God.”). 
53.  “What better training for our youngsters could there be than to have them, each 
time they pledge allegiance to Old Glory, reassert their belief, like that of their fathers and 
their fathers before them, in the all-present, all-knowing, all-seeing, all-powerful Creator.”  
100 CONG. REC. 5915 (1954) (statement of Sen. Wiley). 
54.  68 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)) . 
55.  542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
56.  Id. at 5. 
57.  Id. at 17 (“In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a 
plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when 
prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the source of the 
plaintiff’s claimed standing.”), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
58.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “I do not believe that the phrase ‘under God’ in the 
Pledge converts its recital into a ‘religious exercise’ . . . .  Instead, it is a declaration of belief in 
allegiance and loyalty to the United States flag and the Republic that it represents.”  Id. at 31 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice O’Connor wrote that the phrase, 
although spoken “in the language of religious belief,” is “more properly understood as 
employing the idiom for essentially secular purposes.”  Id. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment).  Justice Thomas stated that “[t]hrough the Pledge policy, the State has not 
created or maintained any religious establishment, and neither has it granted government 
authority to an existing religion.”  Id. at 54 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  See also 
Myers v. Loudoun County Public Schools, 418 F.3d 395, 406 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[N]ot one 
Justice has ever suggested that the Pledge is unconstitutional.  In an area of law sometimes 
marked by befuddlement and lack of agreement, such unanimity is striking.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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D. Legislative Prayer 
The practice of legislative chaplains predates the American 
Revolution.  On September 6, 1774, the day after the colonial 
representatives assembled as the First Continental Congress, a motion 
was made to begin each session with a prayer.59  Some members argued 
against the motion, expressing concern that, in such a setting, prayer 
“would be considered as Enthusiasm & Cant” and cited “the Hazard of 
submitting such a Task to the Judgement of any Clergy.”60  The 
majority, though, believed in “the propriety of a Reverence & 
Submission to the Supreme Being & supplicating his Blessing on every 
Undertaking.”61 
Concern was also expressed about the difficulty in selecting a 
clergyman who could speak to the religiously diverse Congress; some 
worried that “we were so divided in religious Sentiments, some 
Episcopalians, some Quakers, some Aanabaptists, some Presbyterians 
and some Congregationalists, . . . that We could not join in the same Act 
of Worship.”62  As a gesture of good will, Sam Adams, a Massachusetts 
Congregationalist,63 proposed that the prayer be led by a representative 
of the religion that predominated in the southern colonies: “As many of 
our warmest Friends are Members of the Church of England, [I] thought 
it prudent, as well on that as on some other Accounts to move that the 
Service should be performed by a Clergyman of that Denomination.”64  
The cleric who presided over the First Continental Congress was 
Reverend Jacob Duché.65 
 
59.  According to John Adams, Thomas Cushing of Massachusetts made the initial 
motion that daily sessions open with prayer.  Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams 
(Sept. 16, 1774), in 1 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 156, 156 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 
1963); MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, ENDOWED BY OUR CREATOR: THE BIRTH OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM IN AMERICA 44, 48 (2012).  Another delegate, Abraham Clark from New Jersey, 
also claims to have made the motion.  See Letter from Abraham Clark to James Caldwell 
(Aug. 2, 1776), in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 605, 605 (Paul H. 
Smith ed., 1979). 
60.  James Duane’s Notes of Debates (Sept. 6, 1774), in 1 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO 
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 30, 31 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1976) [hereinafter 1 LDC]. 
61.  Id.  
62.  Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, supra note 59, at 156. 
63.  JOHN C. MILLER, SAM ADAMS: PIONEER IN PROPAGANDA 84 (1936). 
64.  Letter from Samuel Adams to Joseph Warren (Sept. 9, 1774), in 1 LDC, supra note 
60, at 55, 55 (emphasis omitted). 
65.  Letter from Abraham Clark to James Caldwell, supra note 59, at 605. 
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In contrast, the Constitutional Convention did not begin its session 
with prayer.  On June 28, 1787, with the Convention deadlocked over 
whether small and large states should have the same voting power, 
Benjamin Franklin urged the delegates to follow the example of the 
Continental Congress.66  He proposed, “henceforth prayers, imploring 
the assistance of Heaven, and its blessing on our deliberations, be held 
in this assembly every morning before we proceed to business; and that 
one or more of the clergy of this city be requested to officiate in that 
service.”67 
Franklin’s proposal was defeated.68  There were rumors that 
Alexander Hamilton had opposed the call for prayer because “he did 
not see the necessity of calling in foreign aid.”69  James Madison 
attributed the convention refusal to vote for Franklin’s motion to both 
“[t]he Quaker usage, never discontinued in the State & the place where 
the Convention held its sittings,” as well as “the discord of religious 
opinions within the Convention.”70  According to a postscript Franklin 
later added to the paper containing his proposal, “The convention, 
except three or four persons, thought prayers unnecessary.”71 
After the Constitution was ratified, though, prayer returned to the 
national legislative chambers.  On April 7, 1789, the second day of its 
existence, the U.S. Senate voted to create a committee to meet with the 
 
66.  See Benjamin Franklin, Speech to the Federal Convention (June 28, 1787), in 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 450, 450–451 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND].  According to Franklin, “In the beginning of the Contest 
with G. Britain, when we were sensible of danger we had daily prayer in this room for the 
divine protection.—Our prayers, Sir, were heard, and they were graciously answered.”  Id. 
67.  BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Dr. Franklin’s Motion for Prayers in the Convention, in 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN & WILLIAM TEMPLE FRANKLIN, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE AND 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 389 (London, 1818). 
68.  See id. 
69.  Letter from William Steele to Jonathan D. Steele, in 3 FARRAND, supra note 66, at 
467, 472–73 (emphasis omitted).  The story probably first appeared in 1825, in a letter from 
William Steele to his son, Jonathan D. Steele, purporting to be an anecdote told to the father 
by Jonathan Dayton, a delegate from New Jersey.  Id. at 467.  According to Madison’s notes, 
Hamilton expressed concern that beginning prayers more than a month after deliberations 
had begun would “lead the public to believe that the embarrassments and dissensions within 
the convention, had suggested this measure.”  1 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 182 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920). 
70.  Letter from James Madison to Thomas S. Grimke (Jan. 6, 1834), in 3 FARRAND, 
supra note 66, at 531, 531.  Madison also pointed to “the lapse of time which had preceded” 
Franklin’s motion.  Id. 
71.  FRANKLIN, supra note 67, at 389 (emphasis omitted). 
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House of Representatives to decide how the two bodies would appoint 
chaplains.72  In less than a week, the joint committee, one that included 
James Madison,73 issued a proposal designed to deal with America’s 
religious diversity by ensuring that different denominations be 
represented and that neither house would be dominated by a single 
denomination.74  This proposal, which was quickly adopted by both 
houses, required 
[t]hat two Chaplains, of different denominations, be appointed to 
Congress for the present session; the Senate to appoint one, and 
give notice thereof to the House of Representatives, who shall 
thereupon appoint the other—which Chaplains shall commence 
their services in the Houses that appoint them, but shall 
interchange weekly.75 
Later in life, Madison wrote that the payment of governmental funds 
for legislative chaplains was a “deviation” from the principle of 
“immunity of Religion from civil jurisdiction.”76  He said that he 
objected to providing for religious worship “approved by the majority, 
and conducted by Ministers of religion paid by the entire nation.”77 
But Madison knew that Congress was unlikely to abolish legislative 
chaplaincies.  Rather than be seen as precedent for governmental 
funding of religion, these expenditures, Madison said, should be viewed 
as simply insignificant violations of constitutional principles: “As the 
precedent is not likely to be rescinded,” he wrote, “the best that can now 
be done, may be to apply to the [Constitution] the maxim of the law, de 
minimis non curat.”78 
 
72.  Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States, in 1 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3, 12 
(Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1972). 
73.  Journal of the First Session of the House of Representatives of the United States, in 3 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 3, 17 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1977). 
74.  Id. at 25. 
75.  Id. at 25–26. 
76.  Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 98, 100 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
77.  James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, in Elizabeth Fleet, Madison’s “Detached 
Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558 (1946) [hereinafter Madison, Detatched 
Memoranda]. 
78.  Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 76, at 100 (emphasis 
added). 
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Since that time, legislative chaplains have been utilized at both the 
national and local level.  In 1983, the Supreme Court upheld Nebraska’s 
practice of paying a chaplain to open legislative sessions with prayer, 
even though “a clergyman of only one denomination—Presbyterian—
[had] been selected for 16 years.”79  The Court reasoned that, “[i]n light 
of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there 
can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with 
prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.”80 
III. THE COURT’S CONFUSION 
There is widespread agreement that the Supreme Court has not been 
able to create and maintain a consistent and coherent system for 
analyzing Establishment Clause issues, such as those arising from the 
above-discussed governmental practices.  The Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence has been termed in “chaos,”81 “confused,”82 and “a 
hopeless muddle.”83 
While much of this criticism is valid, the surprising truth is that in 
many narrow areas the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is quite settled.  This does not mean that there is universal 
 
79.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792–94 (1983). 
80.  Id. at 792.  The Supreme Court extended its rationale in Marsh to permit sectarian 
prayer at local town meetings, even when those meetings “involve participation by ordinary 
citizens.”  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1842 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
81.  John M. Bickers, Of Non-Horses, Quantum Mechanics, and the Establishment 
Clause, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 371, 405 (2009). 
82.  Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century 
Corporate Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 294 (2003). 
83.  Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 728 (2006); see also Daniel O. Conkle, The Establishment Clause and 
Religious Expression in Governmental Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard, 110 
W. VA. L. REV. 315, 315 (2007) (terming the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine “a 
muddled mess”); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: The Supreme Court and 
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495 (1986) (stating that “it has been painfully clear 
that logical consistency and establishment clause jurisprudence were to have little in 
common”); Jay A. Sekulow & Francis J. Manion, The Supreme Court and the Ten 
Commandments: Compounding the Establishment Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 33, 33 (2005) (describing “the fog obscuring” the Court’s “Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence generally”); Mark Strasser, Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement, 
and the Marsh Wild Card, 40 IND. L. REV. 529, 530 (2007) (“The only matters about which 
one can be confident are that the Justices will be divided, the opinion will be rancorous, and 
years of litigation will be required to help clarify the Court’s evolving jurisprudence in this 
area.”); Roxanne L. Houtman, Note, ACLU v. McCreary County: Rebuilding the Wall 
Between Church and State, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 395, 397 (2005) (stating that “the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause [doctrine] . . . has become increasingly ambiguous”). 
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agreement with the way the Court has resolved these issues, merely that 
the Court has created a recognizable and workable standard that is used 
in a generally consistent and predictable manner to resolve particular 
questions.84 
For example, the use of government funding by religious schools and 
religious institutions has been the source of frequent litigation.85  
Nonetheless, the Court finally agreed that, as long as the funding criteria 
were neutral, government funds could be spent by private citizens on 
religious activities:  
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to 
religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of 
citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools 
wholly as a result of their own genuine and  independent private 
choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the 
Establishment Clause.86 
Similarly, the Court has reached a general equilibrium when dealing 
with cases involving prayer in public schools.87  Government officials are 
barred from encouraging the delivery of, or participation in, prayer 
during classes or at “important school events.”88 
A different, but equally straight-forward, rule is applied by the Court 
when analyzing the use of public property by private religious groups.89  
Here, the Establishment Clause is not violated as long as that use is 
according to criteria that are neutral as to religion, is “not sponsored by 
the school, and . . . [the] forum [is] available to other organizations.”90 
 
84.  Cf. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 766 (1979) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (describing a case as one for which “it is more important that it be decided . . . 
than that it be decided correctly”). 
85.  See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 
(1983); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 
664 (1970); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
86.  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652. 
87.  See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577 (1992); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38 (1985); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
88.  Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 317. 
89.  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see also 
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010) (federal statute transferring ownership of cross 
and the tiny parcel of government land on which it stands to a private party). 
90.  Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113. 
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Even the seemingly intractable question of what sorts of exceptions 
from legal requirements can government permissible carve out for 
religious groups has been largely resolved by the Court.91  
Accommodations do not violate the Establishment Clause as long as 
they alleviate “exceptional government-created burdens on private 
religious exercise[,] . . . take adequate account of the burdens a 
requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries[,] and [are] 
. . . administered neutrally among different faiths.”92 
Taken as a group, the rules governing these four areas are 
understandable, usable, and consistent with one another.  If they 
represented the full extent of Establishment Clause questions, there 
would be little cause to argue that the Court’s jurisprudence was 
incoherent.  But when we consider the cases involving governmental 
religious expression, the true cause of the problem emerges.  It is 
primarily these cases that have led to “an Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence rife with confusion.”93 
A. A Judicial Hodgepodge 
If we define the fundamental first-year law student skill of case 
synthesis as “bringing together two, three, four, or more decided cases 
and other legal authorities as support for a single legal idea or 
proposition,”94 it quickly becomes apparent that even the most 
rudimentary form of case synthesis in the area of governmental religious 
expression is impossible.95  Unfortunately, as one scholar wrote, the 
most accurate prediction we can make based on all the relevant cases is 
 
91.  See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. 
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Estate 
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New 
York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952). 
92.  Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 (citation omitted). 
93.  Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1999). 
94.  Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in “Legal Analysis”: A Systematic Approach, 40 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 409, 442–43 (1986); see also DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L. 
KUNZ, SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND WRITING 41 (2d ed. 2003) (stating 
that “the lawyer needs to take account of multiple close cases, ‘fusing’ them into a single rule 
or pattern on that topic that then can be applied to the client’s facts”). 
95.  Students are taught early on that they “must discard a synthesis when it does not 
adequately take into account all relevant cases existing at that time, because such a synthesis 
would be a deficient articulation of the current status of the law in that jurisdiction.”  Jane 
Kent Gionfriddo, Thinking Like a Lawyer: The Heuristics of Case Synthesis, 40 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2007). 
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that “the Justices will be divided, the opinion will be rancorous, and 
years of litigation will be required to help clarify the Court’s evolving 
jurisprudence in this area.”96  The jurisprudential confusion can be seen 
by looking at the opinions of the winning side, those supporting the 
judgment of the Court, in the most recent cases involving governmental 
religious expression. 
In 2004, the Court turned aside on procedural grounds a challenge to 
the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools; three 
Justices wrote expressing their views that the recitation did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.97  The next year, in Van Orden v. Perry,98 the 
Supreme Court ruled that a monument by the Texas State Capitol 
containing the Ten Commandments did not violate the Establishment 
Clause; that case saw a four-Justice plurality and three separate 
concurring opinions.99  The same day Van Orden was decided, the 
Court, in McCreary County v. ACLU,100 declared it unconstitutional for 
two Ohio counties to place a plaque of the Ten Commandments in a 
courthouse; this time there was a majority opinion and one 
concurrence.101  Finally, in 2010, the Court rejected a challenge to a 
federal law transferring ownership of a small plot of government land 
with a Latin cross on it to a private party; this case saw a three-person 
plurality plus three separate concurrences.102  After reading these 
opinions, we still, in the words of one frustrated circuit judge, “remain in 
Establishment Clause purgatory.”103 
In none of these opinions did a single member of the Court rely on 
the so-called “Lemon test.”  That test, first announced in the 1971 case 
Lemon v. Kurtzman,104 presented a three-step analysis for a 
 
96.  Strasser, supra note 83, at 530. 
97.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2004), abrogated on other 
grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
98.  545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
99.  Id. at 679.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, Justices Scalia and 
Thomas signed that opinion and wrote their own concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer 
wrote a concurring opinion but did not sign onto the plurality opinion.  Id. 
100.  545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
101.  Id. at 868–70.  Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion; Justice O’Connor signed 
that opinion and authored a concurrence.  Id. at 848. 
102.  Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).  The plurality was written by Justice 
Kennedy, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.  Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito wrote concurring opinions, and Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring 
opinion, which Justice Thomas joined.  Id. at 1810. 
103.  ACLU of Kentucky v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 2005). 
104.  403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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governmental action to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny: “First, 
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.’”105 
While the Lemon test has been subject to withering attack by many 
of the Justices, it has never been overruled.106  In upholding the 
constitutionality of the Texas Ten Commandments monument, a four-
Justice plurality explicitly rejected the use of the Lemon test in resolving 
the case: “Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger 
scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in 
dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its 
Capitol grounds.”107  The fifth Justice voting to uphold the Texas 
monument, Justice Breyer, also specifically disclaimed reliance on 
Lemon, but without saying the case should be overturned: “While the 
Court’s prior tests provide useful guideposts—and might well lead to 
 
105.  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of 
New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
106.  The most famous disparagement of the Lemon test is Justice Scalia’s comparison of 
it to “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles 
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried.”  Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  For a useful 
summary of the Court’s ambivalence towards the Lemon test, see Utah Highway Patrol 
Association v. American Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the 
denial of certiorari): 
Some of our cases have simply ignored the Lemon or Lemon/endorsement 
formulations.  See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News 
Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 
(1983).  Other decisions have indicated that the Lemon/endorsement test is useful, 
but not binding.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (despite Lemon’s 
usefulness, we are “unwillin[g] to be confined to any single test or criterion in this 
sensitive area”); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (Lemon provides “no 
more than helpful signposts”).  Most recently, in Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677, a 
majority of the Court declined to apply the Lemon/endorsement test in upholding a 
Ten Commandments monument located on the grounds of a state capitol.  Yet in 
another case decided the same day, McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties 
Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–866 (2005), the Court selected the 
Lemon/endorsement test with nary a word of explanation and then declared a 
display of the Ten Commandments in a courthouse to be unconstitutional. 
132 S. Ct. at 14–15 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (parallel 
citations and footnote omitted). 
107.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion).  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the plurality and was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.  Id. at 
679. 
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the same result the Court reaches today, see, e.g., Lemon, . . . —no exact 
formula can dictate a resolution to such fact-intensive cases.”108 
The majority striking down the Kentucky courthouse display of the 
Ten Commandments specifically rejected a call to “abandon Lemon’s 
purpose test.”109  Nonetheless, those Justices never explicitly affirmed 
the three-part test either, since their analysis ended upon their finding 
an impermissible governmental purpose.110 
Parsing the numerous opinions from the cases reveals that there 
were seven disparate “tests” or “standards” utilized by the various 
Justices in the justification of the four Court rulings.111  A review of each 
illuminates the tremendous difficulty the Court has faced in trying to 
articulate a workable standard. 
1. Legislative Purpose of Advancing Religion 
The only majority opinion from this group, McCreary County, 
determined that the appropriate test for analyzing whether the Ten 
Commandments display being challenged was unconstitutional was 
whether the counties acted with the purpose of advancing religion: 
“When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant 
purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment 
Clause value of official religious neutrality . . . .”112  That neutrality 
would be violated if the government were to act with the purpose of 
favoring “one religion over another, or religion over irreligion.”113 
2. Endorsement Test 
The McCreary County majority did not specifically rely on the 
“endorsement test,” even though that test had been utilized by the 
Court in several earlier cases.114  Justice O’Connor, the originator of the 
 
108.  Id. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
109.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005). 
110.  ACLU of Kentucky v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 635–36 (6th Cir. 2005). 
111.  Professor Gey counted even more possible standards: “At one point or another in 
recent years, one or more of the nine Justices have signed opinions proposing ten different 
standards for enforcing the Establishment Clause.”  Gey, supra note 83, at 728.  The list in the 
text is slightly different, focusing solely on the tests that were actually used to reach the 
judgment of the Court. 
112.  McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860. 
113.  Id. at 875. 
114.  In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court stated, “In cases 
involving state participation in a religious activity, one of the relevant questions is ‘whether an 
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the 
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endorsement test, did rely on that test in her concurrence: “The purpose 
behind the counties’ display is relevant because it conveys an 
unmistakable message of endorsement to the reasonable observer.”115  
According to Justice O’Connor, the test for determining whether 
governmental speech violates the Establishment Clause is whether a 
government practice, from “the perception of a reasonable, informed 
observer,”116 has “the effect of communicating a message of government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion.”117 
3. Ceremonial Deism 
The year before McCreary County, Justice O’Connor had argued 
that a public school’s recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including 
the phrase “one Nation under God,” did not violate the Establishment 
Clause because it was a form of “ceremonial deism.”118  This was not a 
repudiation of her endorsement test since, according to Justice 
O’Connor, government references that are categorizable as ceremonial 
deism survive that test because they are “being used to acknowledge 
 
statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools.’”  Santa Fe 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 
(1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).  Similarly, the Court had stated in County 
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989): 
Whether the key word is “endorsement,” “favoritism,” or “promotion,” the essential 
principle remains the same.  The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits 
government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or 
from “making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in 
the political community.” 
492 U.S. at 593–94 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); see also 
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (“In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask ‘whether 
government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.’” (quoting Lynch, 465 
U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring))). 
115.  McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 883–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor 
first proposed the “endorsement test” in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The proper inquiry . . . , I submit, is whether the government 
intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.”). 
116.  Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
117.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
118.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  For the derivation of the phrase “ceremonial deism,” see infra 
notes 173–80 and accompanying text.  A majority of the Court declined to review the merits 
of the case, finding that the father of the school child lacked standing.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 
17–18 (majority opinion), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
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religion or to solemnize an event rather than to endorse religion in any 
way.”119 
Nonetheless, because of the detailed framework that Justice 
O’Connor provided for determining which governmental speech 
qualified as ceremonial deism, it is useful to consider this a distinct 
category.  To decide if a government practice constitutes ceremonial 
deism, Justice O’Connor said that there were four factors to evaluate: 
(a) “History and Ubiquity”—A practice is only to be considered as 
ceremonial deism if it “has been in place for a significant 
portion of the Nation’s history, and when it is observed by 
enough persons that it can fairly be called ubiquitous.”120 
(b) “Absence of worship or prayer”—Ceremonial deism will not 
be found when the government is leading its citizenry in prayer, 
which Justice O’Connor defined as any “statement that has as 
its purpose placing the speaker or listener in a penitent state of 
mind, or that is intended to create a spiritual communion or 
invoke divine aid.”121 
(c) “Absence of reference to particular religion”—Ceremonial 
deism must be non-sectarian and may not “explicitly favor[] 
one particular religious belief system over another.”122 
(d) “Minimal religious content”—Ceremonial deism may only 
contain a very limited, very brief religious reference, what 
Justice O’Connor termed a “highly circumscribed reference to 
God.”123 
4. Acknowledgment of the Nation’s Religious Heritage 
In finding that the placement of a monument containing the Ten 
Commandments on the grounds of the Texas state capitol did not 
violate the Establishment Clause, a four-Justice plurality opinion, 
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, declared that the Constitution did 
not disable “the government from in some ways recognizing our 
religious heritage.”124  The Rehnquist opinion stated that its 
 
119.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 43 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
120.  Id. at 37.   
121.  Id. at 39–41. 
122.  Id. at 42.  
123.  Id. at 42–43. 
124.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684 (2005) (plurality opinion).  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.  This is essentially 
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constitutional analysis was “driven both by the nature of the monument 
and by our Nation’s history”125 but did not specify which aspects of that 
“nature” and “history” were dispositive.126  The opinion did note that 
Texas had “treated its Capitol grounds monuments as representing the 
several strands in the State’s political and legal history.”127  The 
monument, thus, was seen as having a “dual significance,” not only of 
obvious religious meaning but of secular meaning as well.128 
The opinion seems to imply that it was highly relevant that Texas did 
not have a purely religious purpose for maintaining the monument.  In 
distinguishing the Texas monument from Stone v. Graham,129 the 
Kentucky case striking down a statute requiring the posting of the Ten 
Commandments in public schoolrooms, the plurality noted that, “[in] 
the classroom context, [it] found that the Kentucky statute had an 
improper and plainly religious purpose.”130  The opinion added that the 
 
the same rationale used by Chief Justice Rehnquist when he argued that the public school 
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance did not violate the Establishment Clause: “[O]ur 
national culture allows public recognition of our Nation’s religious history and character.”  
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 30 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).  Interestingly, Justice 
O’Connor joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Newdow opinion.  Id. at 33 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
125.  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion). 
126.  The Van Orden plurality analysis is similar, but not identical, to the analysis the 
Court had utilized in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1982), when it upheld the practice of 
legislative prayer.  In Marsh, the Supreme Court seemed to say that the simple fact that 
legislative prayer had been utilized since the time of the framing was sufficient to establish its 
constitutionality:  
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there 
can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has 
become part of the fabric of our society.  To invoke Divine guidance on a public 
body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 
“establishment” of religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable 
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.   
463 U.S. 783, 792 (1982).  The Van Orden plurality did not explicitly state it was using the 
same standard as Marsh but did rely on Marsh for the proposition that 
[r]ecognition of the role of God in our Nation’s heritage has also been reflected in 
our decisions. . . .  This recognition has led us to hold that the Establishment Clause 
permits a state legislature to open its daily sessions with a prayer by a chaplain paid 
by the State.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S., at 792.  Such a practice, we thought, was 
“deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”  Id., at 786. 
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 688 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). 
127.  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691 (plurality opinion). 
128.  Id. at 692. 
129.  449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
130.  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690 (plurality opinion). 
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Stone decision did not imply that its holding would “extend to displays 
of the Ten Commandments that lack a ‘plainly religious,’ ‘pre-eminent 
purpose.’”131  It would be a mistake, though, to treat this plurality as 
actually agreeing with the majority in McCreary County that a 
“purpose” of favoring either one religion over another religion, or 
religion in general over irreligion, would violate the Establishment 
Clause.  All four Justices who signed onto the Rehnquist opinion also 
signed onto Justice Scalia’s dissent in McCreary County, which rejected 
the “purpose” analysis on the ground that “even an exclusive purpose to 
foster or assist religious practice is not necessarily invalidating.”132 
5. Sectarian Endorsement 
In his concurrence to the Texas monument case, Justice Scalia 
seemed to be proposing an Endorsement Clause test that would permit 
government to endorse religion in general but not necessarily a 
particular religious doctrine.  The test he proposed was: “[T]here is 
nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, 
honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a 
nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.”133  Even 
though his short Van Orden concurrence did not explicitly state that 
governmental sectarian endorsement would be unconstitutional, Justice 
Scalia made that distinction in his dissent in Lee v. Weisman,134 in which 
he stated that 
our constitutional tradition . . . ruled out of order government-
sponsored endorsement of religion . . . where the endorsement is 
sectarian, in the sense of specifying details upon which men and 
women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and 
Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the divinity 
of Christ).135 
 
131.  Id. at 691 n.11 (quoting Stone, 449 U.S. at 41). 
132.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 902–03 (2005) (Scalia, J. dissenting) 
(emphasis omitted). 
133.  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J. concurring).  For a discussion of why Justice 
Scalia’s assertion that venerating the Ten Commandments is not the same as venerating 
religion in general, see infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. 
134.  505 U.S. 577 (1992).  This case struck down a non-denominational prayer delivered 
at a public high school graduation.  Id. at 585–86. 
135.  Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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6. Coercion 
Justice Thomas, in both his Van Orden and Newdow concurrences, 
argued that the only government activity that was prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause was “actual legal coercion.”136  Under this 
approach, a mere governmental “endorsement,” either of religion in 
general or of a particular denomination’s beliefs, would not violate the 
Constitution.  According to Thomas, the Establishment Clause is not 
implicated absent the “coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial 
support by force of law and threat of penalty,”137 such as “mandatory 
observance or mandatory payment of taxes supporting ministers.”138  
Thus, all governmental religious expression, as long as it did not directly 
“compel” anyone “to do anything,” would be permissible.139 
7. Avoiding Divisiveness 
Justice Breyer was the only Justice to vote in favor of the Court’s 
judgment in both Van Orden and McCreary County.140  Thus, he was the 
only Justice to find a constitutional distinction between the Ten 
Commandments displayed on a monument in front of a state capital and 
inside the courthouse.  Although Justice Breyer disclaimed the hope of 
finding a “single mechanical formula”141 and declared that there was “no 
 
136.  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted).  According to Justice Thomas, even this Establishment 
Clause limitation should only be directed at the federal government.  Id.  He argued that the 
Establishment Clause was solely designed as a structural protection for federalism—i.e., 
preventing federal interference with state establishments—and thus could not be 
incorporated to apply to the states.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  As a matter of historical fact, this latter claim is demonstrably incorrect.  See 
MEYERSON, supra note 59, at 172–76. 
137.  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
138.  Id. (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 729 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
139.  Id. at 694. 
140.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 848 (2005); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  He also voted with the Court majority in Newdow, 
albeit without offering an opinion on the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance.  
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 3.  He was however, in the dissent in Salazar v. Buono, 130 U.S. 1803, 
1842 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
141.  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment,”142 the ultimate 
concern he expressed was the need to avoid political divisiveness.143 
The features of the Texas monument display that led him to 
conclude that they did not threaten to cause such divisiveness were that 
they were part of a display that included numerous secular messages and 
they had been on public grounds for forty years with no previous legal 
complaint.144  By contrast, he said, the history of the Kentucky 
courthouse displays “indicates a governmental effort substantially to 
promote religion.”145 
But most significantly to Justice Breyer, it seems, the recency of the 
courthouse displays presented a much greater threat; unlike the Texas 
monument, “a more contemporary state effort to focus attention upon a 
religious text is certainly likely to prove divisive in a way that this 
longstanding, pre-existing monument has not.”146  Removing the older 
monument, he warned, was not simply unnecessary for avoiding 
divisiveness but would evince such “hostility” to religion as to “create 
the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment 
Clause seeks to avoid.”147 
B. Seven Flawed Standards 
There is obviously no way to synthesize these seven standards into a 
single usable test.  It is also beyond question that no single rule could 
unite this disparate Court.  What is perhaps more surprising, though, is 
that each of their standards is fundamentally flawed. 
Justice Thomas’s claim that the Establishment Clause only prohibits 
legal coercion is the easiest to dismiss, as such a radical change to our 
legal culture has been wisely rejected by every other member of the 
Court.148  Justice Thomas’s standard would eviscerate the “principle of 
 
142.  Id. at 700, 703–04. 
143.  See id. 
144.  Id. at 702–03. 
145.  Id. at 703. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Id. at 704. 
148.  See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious 
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 998 (2010) (“Of the nine Justices currently on the 
Court, the best guess is that eight of them support this ban on denominational religious 
speech—the only dissenter seems to be Justice Thomas.”). 
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denominational neutrality.”149  It would permit the “permanent erection 
of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall” and allow a state 
government, and indeed the federal government, to “proselytize on 
behalf of a particular religion.”150 
Even the Justices who have been most willing to allow religious 
governmental speech have recognized that the Establishment Clause 
was “designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a 
preference for one religious denomination or sect over others.  Given 
the ‘incorporation’ of the Establishment Clause . . . , States are 
prohibited as well from establishing a religion or discriminating between 
sects.”151  As Justice Scalia asserted, were a government to “take sides in 
a theological dispute” with an “endorsement of a particular version of 
the Decalogue as authoritative,” that would violate the Establishment 
Clause as an “impermissible endorsement of a particular religious 
view.”152 
Accepting that at least some form of governmental endorsement is 
unconstitutional, the Justices have been divided over whether the 
Establishment Clause prohibits only sectarian endorsements or extends 
to prohibit endorsements of religion over non-religion.  Based on the 
way these arguments are framed today, neither side can withstand 
careful scrutiny.  
One weakness with the argument of those who would permit the 
government to endorse religion over non-religion is that it would violate 
several fundamental precepts of religious freedom.  First, it contradicts 
the principle that the “government has no legitimate role in shaping the 
 
149.  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); see also Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 214–15 (1963) (quoting an unpublished opinion of Judge Alphonso Taft in Minor v. 
Board of Education of Cincinnati (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati 1870) (Taft, J., dissenting), in THE 
BIBLE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 351, 415 (Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1870) (“The 
government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none.” 
(emphasis omitted))). 
150.  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
151.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
152.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.4 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Interestingly, Justice Thomas joined this dissent.  See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I will further concede that our constitutional tradition . . . [has] 
ruled out of order government-sponsored endorsement of religion . . . where the endorsement 
is sectarian, in the sense of specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a 
benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the 
divinity of Christ).”).  Justice Thomas also signed onto Justice Scalia’s Lee dissent.  Id. at 631. 
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religious opinions of the American people.”153  The government is not 
charged with being the nation’s religious teacher.  As James Madison 
wrote, this principle requires that, “[in] matters of Religion, no man’s 
right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is 
wholly exempt from its cognizance.”154 
A second flaw, to again quote Madison, is that permitting the 
government to pronounce that it prefers those who believe in religion 
“degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in 
Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.”155  As 
Justice O’Connor explained, it violates the principles behind the 
Establishment Clause for the government to send “a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 
insiders, favored members of the political community.”156 
Finally, the position that government can endorse religion in general 
but not a particular religion is doomed to collapse over the fact that 
governmental endorsement of religion will inevitably conform to the 
views and practices of the majority religion.  Take, for example, a 
concept as seemingly all-inclusive as National Prayer Day.  According to 
federal law, the President must “issue each year a proclamation 
designating the first Thursday in May as a National Day of Prayer on 
which the people of the United States may turn to God in prayer and 
meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals.”157  Even when 
attempting to talk to all religions, Congress could not avoid singling out 
“churches” in preference to mosques, synagogues, and other places 
where non-Christians pray.  Preferences for religion in general will 
always tend toward preferences to “the standard of the predominant 
sect.”158 
Those contending that the Establishment Clause bars all 
endorsement of religion, including religion in general over non-religion, 
as well as those who assert that the “central Establishment Clause value 
of official religious neutrality” is violated when government acts with 
 
153.  Laycock, supra note 2, at 230. 
154.  Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON 183, 185 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). 
155.  Id. at 188. 
156.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
157.  36 U.S.C. § 119 (2012) (emphasis added). 
158.  Madison, Detatched Memoranda, supra note 77, at 561. 
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the purpose of favoring “religion over irreligion,”159 face an 
insurmountable burden.  Neither principle has ever been consistently 
applied, even by their most ardent supporters.160  As Justice Kennedy 
argued when the endorsement test was first used by the Court, 
Either the endorsement test must invalidate scores of traditional 
practices recognizing the place religion holds in our culture, or it 
must be twisted and stretched to avoid inconsistency with 
practices we know to have been permitted in the past, while 
condemning similar practices with no greater endorsement effect 
simply by reason of their lack of historical antecedent.161 
The Court has upheld legislative prayer,162 property tax exemptions 
for church property,163 and the Pledge of Allegiance to a nation “under 
God,”164 among many other governmental activities that unmistakably 
fail the endorsement test’s requirement of total neutrality between 
religion and non-religion.165  As one commentator noted, “Any 
explanation of why these practices survive constitutional scrutiny under 
this test, while school prayer and other practices invalidated by the 
Court do not, is hopelessly inadequate.”166  
In reality, the best explanation for the inconsistent application of the 
endorsement test may well be the Justices’ “fear of the backlash that 
could result from the full enforcement of the neutrality principle.”167  
The consequence from such enforcement “would be too unpopular, do 
 
159.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860, 875 (2005). 
160.  “One of the criticisms sometimes made of the Endorsement Test is that it cannot 
account for all of the practices that the Court has upheld.”  Strasser, supra note 83, at 566. 
161.  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
162.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
163.  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
164.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004), abrogated on other 
grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).  
While the Court rejected the challenge to the Pledge on procedural grounds, no Justice even 
intimated that the Pledge would violate the Establishment Clause.   
165.  See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 891 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(detailing “the variety of circumstances in which this Court . . . has approved government 
action ‘undertaken with the specific intention of improving the position of religion’” (quoting 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
166.  Epstein, supra note 19, at 2173–74. 
167.  Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten 
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1123 
(2006); see also McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 890 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has not 
had the courage (or the foolhardiness) to apply the neutrality principle consistently.”). 
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too much damage to the Court’s credibility, and do too little good for 
religious minorities and nonbelievers.”168  Justice Scalia terms the 
Court’s “instinct for self-preservation” as the factor that keeps the 
Justices from going “too far down the road of an enforced neutrality 
that contradicts both historical fact and current practice.”169  Thus, the 
endorsement test is simply “ignored” when its application would 
“prohibit things the Court seems to wish to protect.”170 
One way some Justices have tried to explain how obviously religious 
governmental expression has passed the endorsement test is by terming 
such permitted expression ceremonial deism.  The phrase “ceremonial 
deism” was apparently invented in 1962 by Walter Rostow, Dean of 
Yale Law School.171  He used the phrase to denote a “class of public 
activity, which . . . [could] be accepted as so conventional and 
uncontroversial as to be constitutional.” 172 
“Ceremonial deism” is, in reality, quite a peculiar phrase.173  The 
word “deism” is generally associated with the religious beliefs of 
Thomas Paine and several of the other Framers.174  “Deism in America 
was a product of French intellectual thought in the eighteenth century 
and had among its fundamental principles the existence of a Supreme 
Deity, worthy of adoration, and the necessity of religious liberty.  It also 
eschewed theological and ecclesiastical extremes.”175  Modifying the 
 
168.  Douglas Laycock, Church and State in the United States: Competing Conceptions 
and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 503, 529 (2006). 
169.  McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 892–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
170.  John M. Bickers, Standing on Holy Ground: How Rethinking Justiciability Might 
Bring Peace to the Establishment Clause, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 432 (2012). 
171.  Arthur E. Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 & n.7 (1964) (reviewing 
WILBER G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1964)). 
172.  Id. at 86. 
173.  
Note that “ceremonial deism” is a term of art and distinct from the theological 
definition of Deism as “the belief, claiming foundation solely upon the evidence of 
reason, in the existence of God as the creator of the universe who after setting it in 
motion abandoned it, assumed no control over life, exerted no influence on natural 
phenomena, and gave no supernatural revelation.” 
Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA 
L. REV. 1545, 1549 n.14 (2010) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 348 (William Morris ed., 1978)). 
174.  Thomas Paine, Of the Religion of Deism Compared with the Christian Religion, and 
the Superiority of the Former over the Latter (1804), reprinted in ‘IN GOD WE TRUST’: THE 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS 430 (Norman 
Cousins ed., 1958). 
175.  Epstein, supra note 19, at 2091 (footnotes omitted). 
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word “deism” with the word “ceremonial” does more than merely limit 
the location of religious phraseology to “ceremonial, as opposed to 
theological, settings.”176  It also shrinks the meaning of “deism” to non-
sectarian religious expression.177 
While no majority opinion of the Supreme Court has either explicitly 
adopted or rejected the concept of ceremonial deism,178 a few Justices 
have stated that it would help resolve difficult Establishment Clause 
cases.  According to Justice O’Connor, the concept of ceremonial deism 
includes the Pledge of Allegiance, as well as “the national motto (‘In 
God We Trust’), religious references in traditional patriotic songs such 
as The Star-Spangled Banner, and the words with which the Marshal of 
this Court opens each of its sessions (‘God save the United States and 
this honorable Court’).”179 
One of the major objections to the category of ceremonial deism is 
that it is a result-oriented label, easily “subject to manipulation.”180  
Ceremonial deism has been termed an “amorphous concept” which has 
been frequently utilized “as a springboard from which to hold that other 
challenged practices,” such as the cross in a city’s insignia or a state’s 
celebration of Good Friday, do not violate the Establishment Clause.181 
The most fundamental objection to the concept of ceremonial deism, 
though, is that it is built on the erroneous, if not dishonest, foundation 
that religious words have no religious significance.  When Justice 
Brennan first expressed support for the concept, he said the examples of 
 
176.  Id. 
177.  Cass Sunstein has defined ceremonial deism as the “non-coercive public displays 
that refer to God in the way that is time honored and fits with our traditions.”  Cass R. 
Sunstein, Celebrating God, Constitutionally, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 567, 567 (2006); see 
also Corbin, supra note 173, at 1546 (“Ceremonial deism is defined as a longstanding religious 
practice—sometimes extending back to the nation’s founding—with de minimis and 
nonsectarian religious content.”). 
178.  Strasser, supra note 83, at 559; see also Hill, supra note 36, at 717 (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has shown no great appetite for addressing the constitutionality of ceremonial deism.”). 
179.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
180.  Laycock, supra note 2, at 240; see also Michael M. Maddigan, Comment, The 
Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 293, 345 
(1993) (“Ceremonial deism, then, is a nebulous and ill-defined concept that has become 
nothing more than a shorthand for what some Justices believe are ‘constitutionally acceptable 
religious practices.’”). 
181.  Epstein, supra note 19, at 2086 & n.13 (describing Murray v. City of Austin, 947 
F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991) (cross in city insignia), and Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (upholding Good Friday holiday)). 
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ceremonial deism were “protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny 
chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant 
religious content.”182  Similarly, Justice O’Connor said that “[a]ny 
religious freight the words may have been meant to carry originally has 
long since been lost.”183 
This assertion is incorrect: “[I]t is simply untrue for many people 
that ‘under God’ has lost its religious meaning.”184  While it is 
doubtlessly accurate to say that many people do not feel these phrases 
have religious significance, to many others the religious language 
continues to express deep religious meaning.  Assertions to the contrary 
“demean the expressions and insult the intelligence.”185 
A similar critique can be made of the Van Orden plurality’s standard 
asserting that the Establishment Clause is not violated if the government 
is simply “recognizing our religious heritage.”186  The problem with this 
approach is that it, by ipse dixit, denies the religious nature of religious 
words. 
 
182.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
183.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 39–41 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also 
Bell, supra note 20, at 1274–75 (“When considering phrases such as ‘God Save the United 
States and this Honorable Court’ and ‘In God We Trust,’ the Court has engaged in 
‘secularization,’ justifying religious practices and expressions based on their context or 
tradition.” (footnote omitted)); Andrew Rotstein, Note, Good Faith? Religious-Secular 
Parallelism and the Establishment Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1772 (1993) (stating that 
certain religious phrases “have largely or totally lost their religious significance because of 
their passive character or their longstanding repetition in a civic context”). 
184.  Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 41, 48 (2003); see also Daniel O. Conkle, Religious Expression and Symbolism in the 
American Constitutional Tradition: Governmental Neutrality, but Not Indifference, 13 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 417, 433 (2006) (“By all indications, the governmental expression in 
question does promote and endorse religion, and it does so deliberately.”). 
185.  Steven D. Smith, How Is America “Divided by God”?, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 141, 155 
(2007).  Many have also felt that the denial of religious meaning can be seen as insulting 
people of faith who see great religious significance in religious language.  See, e.g., Myers v. 
Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 407 (4th Cir. 2005) (saying that “it is demeaning to 
persons of any faith to assert that the words ‘under God’ contain no religious significance”); 
Robert A. Schapiro, The Consequences of Human Rights Foundationalism, 54 EMORY L.J. 
171, 179 (2005) (stating that treating references to God as meaningless “would be insulting to 
those who take references to God quite seriously”). 
186.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684 (2005) (plurality opinion).  In arguing that 
the Pledge of Allegiance did not violate the Establishment Clause, several Justices, 
“repeatedly used the words ‘describe,’ ‘acknowledge,’ and their synonyms.”  Hill, supra note 
36, at 729. 
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According to Douglas Laycock, this sort of approach is essentially “a 
polite lie.”187  The assertion that religious speech has become 
“secularized” permits courts to uphold governmental religious speech 
“but still maintain lip service to the constitutional principle of religious 
neutrality.”188  When a legislative chaplain is leading legislators in a 
devout prayer, it is disingenuous to contend that this pious activity has 
only been designed to “recognize[] the rich religious heritage of our 
country”189 or is “simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely 
held among the people of this country.”190  A sustainable legal rule 
cannot be premised on a transparent “legal fiction,” one in which courts 
insist that governmental religious speech and actions are “nonreligious 
as a matter of law, no matter how religious they might be as a matter of 
fact.”191 
Justice Breyer’s approach of avoiding religious divisiveness has the 
virtue of forthrightness as well as a philosophical linkage to the thoughts 
and practices of George Washington.192  Nonetheless, as Justice Breyer 
himself admitted, his methodology is too amorphous to be described as 
a legal standard.  He relied not upon “any particular test” but instead 
“upon consideration of the basic purposes of the First Amendment’s 
Religion Clauses themselves.”193  In his analysis, there is “no test-related 
substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”194 
An obvious difficulty with this approach is that there is no way to 
predict ahead of time how a court will exercise its legal judgment in 
determining what religious governmental actions will be deemed 
unacceptably divisive.  Moreover, the fluid nature of relying on the 
“purposes” of the First Amendment will inevitably lead to the 
perception, if not reality, that Justices are “ruling now this way, now 
 
187.  Laycock, supra note 2, at 225. 
188.  Christopher C. Lund, The Future of the Establishment Clause in Context: A 
Response to Ledewitz, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 767, 768 (2012). 
189.  Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(O’Connor, J., retired, sitting by designation), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 909 (2009).  It was 
similarly disingenuous when the Court contended that a governmental display of a nativity 
scene merely “depict[ed] the historical origins” of Christmas.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 680 (1984). 
190.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). 
191.  Lund, supra note 188, at 769. 
192.  See infra notes 286–92 and accompanying text. 
193.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703–04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
194.  Id. at 700. 
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that—thumbs up or thumbs down—as their personal preferences 
dictate.”195 
One of the major obstacles that has prevented the Court from 
reaching a workable standard for judging the constitutionality of 
religious government speech is the Justices’ collective misreading of the 
actions and understandings of the Framers who helped draft and 
implement the First Amendment.  The Court has asserted continually 
that history plays an especially critical role in the creation of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.196  As Justice Wiley Rutledge 
declared, “No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or 
given content by its generating history than the religious clause of the 
First Amendment.  It is at once the refined product and the terse 
summation of that history.”197  It is thus particularly disheartening that 
the history relied upon is so often “bad history.” 198  
Justices have been accurately categorized as engaging in “law office 
histor[y],” in which they “selectively recount[] facts, emphasizing data 
that support the recorder’s own prepossessions and minimizing 
significant facts that complicate or conflict with that bias.”199  They 
create “a stark, crabbed, oversimplified picture of the past, developed 
largely to plead a case.”200  If the Justices had a more complete and more 
accurate understanding of how the Framers understood and utilized 
governmental religious expression, they might have an easier time 
creating a predictable, usable standard. 
 
195.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 891 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
196.  “From the Supreme Court’s first Religion Clause case, . . . Justices have appealed 
to the history surrounding the writing of the First Amendment, the Founders generally, and 
specific Founders to shine light upon the meaning of the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses.”  Hall, supra note 18, at 567. 
197.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also 
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “the meaning of the Clause is to be 
determined by reference to historical practices and understandings”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The true meaning of the Establishment 
Clause can only be seen in its history.”). 
198.  Green, supra note 13, at 1719. 
199.  Daniel L. Dreisbach, A Lively and Fair Experiment: Religion and the American 
Constitutional Tradition, 49 EMORY L.J. 223, 234 (2000) (book review) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
200.  Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, in 
ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 77, 80 (Gottfried Dietze ed., 1964). 
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IV. HOW THE FRAMERS SPOKE ABOUT RELIGION 
We should not expect the framing generation to have considered the 
relationship between religion and government in a simplistic way.  They 
were capable of sophisticated, multifaceted thinking, and the balance 
they struck reflects a complexity that modern commentators have often 
underestimated.  The inability to recognize the nuanced compromise 
reached by the Framers has contributed to the Court’s failure to reach 
any sort of consensus on the proper test for evaluating the 
Establishment Clause. 
A. Never a Christian Nation 
Justices who view the Constitution as limiting governmental 
religious speech erroneously assume that, except for Jefferson and 
Madison, the Framers viewed the First Amendment solely as protection 
for Christians.201  In McCreary County, for example, Justice Souter, 
writing for the majority, stated that “history shows that the religion of 
concern to the Framers was not that of the monotheistic faiths generally, 
but Christianity in particular.”202  To support this conclusion, Justice 
Souter quotes from Justice Story’s book Commentaries on the 
Constitution: “Justice Story probably reflected the thinking of the 
framing generation when he wrote in his Commentaries that the 
purpose of the Clause was ‘not to countenance, much less to advance, 
Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; 
but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects.’”203 
In reality, Justice Story was wrong about the framing generation, and 
his mistake was made for the same reasons as Justice Daniel Brewer’s 
 
201.  See, e.g., Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1410 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Perhaps 
originally the Religion Clauses merely sought to protect the diversity of faiths and practices 
within Christianity itself.”). 
202.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 880 (2005); see also Freedom from 
Religion Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1062 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (“If one were to 
read the establishment clause as permitting any practice in existence around the time of the 
framers, this would likely mean that the government would be free to discriminate against all 
non-Christians.”), vacated on other grounds, 641 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2011). 
203.  McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 880.  Although the quote is from 3 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1871, at 728 (Boston, 
Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833), Justice Souter, for some reason, cites to a secondary source, 
ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND 
CURRENT FICTION 13 (1988), a book that Mark Tushnet accurately describes as “a work of 
crank constitutional law,” Mark Tushnet, Book Review, 45 LA. L. REV. 175, 175 (1984) 
(reviewing ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND 
CURRENT FICTION (1982)). 
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erroneous assertion sixty years later that the United States “is a 
Christian nation.”204  Both Justices Story and Brewer relied almost 
exclusively on the practices of the colonies and states, rather than those 
of the federal government following the enactment of the Constitution.  
For example, Justice Brewer, other than quoting the First Amendment 
and the constitutional provision giving the President ten days, “Sundays 
excepted,” to decide whether to sign or veto legislation,205 only cited 
colonial charters, the Declaration of Independence, and the common 
law systems of Pennsylvania and New York.206  Similarly, Justice Story 
only cites one source for support, the House of Representatives’ debate 
on the First Amendment, in which neither the word “Christianity” is 
mentioned nor is there a discussion of other religions.207 
Justices Story and Brewer were wrong.  A comprehensive review of 
the practices of the framing generation shows that they neither believed 
that America was a “Christian Nation” nor that the First Amendment 
only protected Christianity.  That review also shows the fundamental 
error in Justice Scalia’s assumption that the Framers’ use of religion in 
their public speech endorsed “inescapably the God of monotheism.”208  
The key to understanding the Framing Generation is the realization 
that they believed that the Constitution had created a new entity, a 
national government not dependent on the state governments, one that 
was capable of having a distinct identity.  The Framers had a vision of 
religious liberty for the national government that was entirely different 
from the concept that prevailed in the several states.   
This distinction can be seen in two famous letters written by 
Presidents Washington and Jefferson.  In the first, Washington’s 1790 
letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport Rhode Island, he 
explained his vision for American universal religious freedom.  He 
began by acknowledging the change in perception of the source of 
religious freedom: “It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it 
was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the 
 
204.  Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). 
205.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
206.  Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 466–72. 
207.  STORY, supra note 203, § 1868, at 726.  In a footnote, Story cites “2 Lloyd’s Deb. 
195, 196,” which corresponds to 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730–31.  Id. 
208.  McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 894 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
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exercise of their inherent natural rights.”209  He then pronounced his 
description of the American guarantee of religious equality: “For 
happily the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no 
sanction, to persecution no assistance requires only that they who live 
under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in 
giving it on all occasions their effectual support.”210 
Note that Washington placed his focus on “the Government of the 
United States.”  Under the Constitution, a distinct national perspective 
of freedom of religion was created; it was the “Government of the 
United States” that no longer sanctioned religious bigotry, regardless of 
the discrimination that might still occur in the several states. 
Similarly, a careful reading of the 1802 letter in which Jefferson 
provided the metaphor of  “a wall of separation between Church & 
State” reveals that that wall was only legally required for the federal 
government.211  Jefferson’s letter had been written in response to a letter 
from a committee of Baptists from Danbury, Connecticut.212  They had 
written Jefferson to complain about their home state’s religious 
establishment.213  They wrote that Connecticut did not accept the 
Baptists’ view of religious liberty, which was that “the legitimate Power 
of civil Government extends no further than to punish the man who 
works ill to his neighbour.”214  In Connecticut, they said, “Religion is 
consider[e]d as the first object of Legislation; & therefore what religious 
privileges we enjoy (as a minor part of the State) we enjoy as favors 
granted, and not as inalienable rights.”215 
The committee did not ask Jefferson to intervene directly in state 
affairs.  In fact, they acknowledged both “that the President of the 
[U]nited States, is not the national Legislator, & also sensible that the 
 
209.  Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode 
Island (Aug. 18, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 
284, 285 (Mark A. Mastromarino ed., 1996). 
210.  Id. (emphasis added). 
211.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 
1802), in 36 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 258, 258 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2009); see 
also Daniel L. Dreisbach, “Sowing Useful Truths and Principles”: The Danbury Baptists, 
Thomas Jefferson, and the “Wall of Separation,” 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 455 (1997). 
212.  Dreisbach, supra note 211, at 457. 
213.  Letter from Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson to 
Thomas Jefferson, reprinted in Dreisbach, supra note 211, at 460. 
214.  Id. at 460 (emphasis omitted). 
215.  Id. 
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national government cannot destroy the Laws of each State.”216  
Nonetheless, they expressed the hope that “the sentiments of our 
beloved President . . . will shine & prevail through all these States and 
all the world till Hierarchy and tyranny be destroyed from the Earth.”217 
Jefferson’s well-known response echoed the Connecticut Baptists’ 
view that the national government’s understanding of the proper 
relationship between religion and government could serve as an 
exemplar for the individual States.218  Jefferson, after expressing 
agreement that “religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his 
God . . . [and] the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, 
& not opinions,” declared his view that the national government was 
restricted by the First Amendment, citing the “act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church & 
State.”219  Jefferson then stated that he hoped the example of the 
national government would be followed in each state: “[A]dhering to 
this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of 
conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those 
sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights . . . .”220 
There are several factors that led to the creation of a national view 
of the “rights of conscience” that was distinct from the individual states 
and far more respectful of those who did not share the majority’s 
religious faith.  One of the most important was that, while the individual 
states began as narrowly focused, religiously homogeneous 
communities, the United States was born a pluralistic nation made up of 
multiple religious groups. 
A statistical analysis conducted by Roger Finke and Rodney Stark 
for their book The Churching of America, 1776–2005 reveals how much 
 
216.  Id. 
217.  Id. 
218.  In a later letter, Jefferson similarly explained that although many New England 
states still had established churches, the United States Constitution “protects the rights of 
conscience against the enterprises of the civil authority.  It has not left the religion of its 
citizens under the power of its public functionaries . . . .”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
the Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church at New London, Connecticut (Feb. 4, 1809), in 
16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 331, 331–32 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903). 
219.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association, supra note 211, 
at 258 (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
220.  Id. 
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more diverse the new nation as a whole was than the individual states.221  
In the United States, larger denominations were far less prominent and 
smaller denominations were far more numerous.  For example, the 
Congregationalists, the largest denomination in Massachusetts in 1776, 
made up more than 71% of all the state’s religious congregations.222  
Southern states, while not as lopsided, were still dominated by a single 
group, with Episcopalian congregations, at 34.6%, the greatest number 
in Virginia, and Presbyterians, at 28.5%, the largest in North Carolina.223  
No state matched the diversity of the entire United States, in which the 
largest denomination, Congregationalists, comprised barely more than 
20% of all congregations.224 
Another way to measure religious diversity is to calculate the 
number of significant-sized denominations.  Eight different 
denominations—Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, 
Baptists, Quakers, the German Reformed, Lutherans, and the Dutch 
Reformed—accounted for at least 3% of all the nation’s 
congregations.225  Most individual states contained only four to six 
denominations that comprised at least 3% of their congregations, with 
New York being the only state with eight denominations of that 
proportion.226 
Small denominations, those containing less than 3% of the 
congregations in a particular area, were also a much more significant 
political factor on the national level.  In the United States, the 
combination of small denominations—including Methodists, Catholics, 
Moravians, Separatists and Independents, Dunkers, Mennonites, 
Huguenots, Sandemanians, and Jews—contained more than one-third 
of the number of congregations of the largest national denomination, 
Congregationalists.227  Except in Pennsylvania (which had a similar ratio 
to the national level), the predominant state denomination dwarfed the 
combined small local denominations by between 4–1 and 38–1.228  It is 
not surprising, therefore, to find more deference paid to the interests 
 
221.  ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776–2005: 
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY 281–94 (2005). 
222.  Id. at 286 tbl.A1. 
223.  Id. at 288 tbl.A1. 
224.  Id. at 284 tbl.A1. 
225.  Id. 
226.  Id. 
227.  Id. 
228.  Id. 
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and sensitivities of religious minorities at the national level than at the 
state level, and far more pressure placed on the local level to assist the 
most powerful denominations. 
In part, this was a phenomenon foreshadowed by the observation in 
James Madison’s Federalist 10 essay, in which he warned that in 
individual states, with their relatively small populations, it was easier for 
“a majority [to] be found of the same party” and to “concert and 
execute their plans of oppression.”229  The national government, with a 
much larger population, would “[e]xtend the sphere, and . . . take in a 
greater variety of parties and interests.”230  This, Madison predicted, 
would “make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a 
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”231 
Many of the Framers understood that to govern and unite a 
religiously diverse population would require a different approach than 
that practiced in the individual states.  For example, Oliver Ellsworth, a 
Connecticut delegate to the Constitutional Convention, wrote an essay 
under the name “A Landowner” explaining why national religious tests 
would be impractical:  
A test in favor of any one denomination of Christians would be 
to the last degree absurd in the United States.  If it were in favor 
of either Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, 
Baptists, or Quakers, it would incapacitate more than three-
fourths of the American citizens for any public office; and thus 
degrade them from the rank of freemen.232 
Daniel Shute, first minister of the Second Congregational Church of 
Hingham, Massachusetts, also used the size and diversity of the United 
States to argue against religious oaths:  
In this great and extensive empire, there is and will be a great 
variety of sentiments in religion among its inhabitants.  Upon the 
plan of a religious test, the question I think must be, who shall be 
excluded from national trusts?  Whatever answer bigotry may 
 
229.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 52 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
230.  Id. 
231.  Id.  
232.  Oliver Ellsworth, A Landholder VII (Dec. 17, 1787), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 497, 499 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978). 
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suggest, the dictates of candour and equity, I conceive, will be 
none.233 
In addition to the demographic realities of “this great and extensive 
empire,” a second major factor in the creation of a new national view of 
freedom of religion was the personal convictions of the earliest national 
leaders.  While the contributions of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison are well known, it may have been the words and actions of 
George Washington that did the most to create the American vision of 
the proper relationship between government and religion.  
B. George Washington and the Tax to Support Christian Teachers 
Arguably the most critical moment in the development of 
Washington’s insistence on the creation of a national vision of the rights 
of conscience occurred a few years prior to the drafting of the First 
Amendment, during the battle in Virginia over Patrick Henry’s bill to 
authorize taxation to support “teachers of the Christian religion.”234  
Under Henry’s proposal, taxpayers could designate the “society of 
Christians” to which they wished to have their money allocated.235  The 
revenue from those who did not designate a “Christian society” was to 
be distributed, “under the direction of the General Assembly, for the 
encouragement of seminaries of learning.”236 
The fight to defeat the bill was led by James Madison.  He largely 
orchestrated a ten-month political campaign, from December 1785–
 
233.  Convention Debates, 31 January, A.M. (Jan. 31, 1788), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1373, 1376, 1379 n.5 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000) (emphasis omitted).  
234.  Patrick Henry, A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian 
Religion (1784), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 supplemental app. at 72 
(1947) (title case omitted). 
235.  Id. at 73.  In a cramped attempt at religious sensitivity, the bill gave Quakers and 
Mennonites, who did not use paid religious teachers, more freedom as to how the money 
should be spent than the other Christian denominations.  The bill required other 
denominations to appropriate the money for the “provision for a Minister or Teacher of the 
Gospel of their denomination, or the providing place of divine worship, and to none other use 
whatsoever,” while Quakers and Mennonites were permitted to place the money “in their 
general fund, to be disposed of in a manner which they shall think best calculated to promote 
their particular mode of worship.”  Id. at 74. 
236.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 853 n.1 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Henry, supra note 234, at 74). 
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October 1786, to generate state wide opposition to the proposal.237  He 
wrote a petition, his “Memorial and Remonstrance,” to help garner 
signatures to present to the legislature.238  This petition declared that 
“[r]eligion is wholly exempt from [the] . . . cognizance” of “Civil 
Society” in general and the legislature in particular.239  Madison also 
stated, “It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such 
homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him.”240 
Madison had written his petition anonymously, and when George 
Mason sent a copy to George Washington, Mason did not tell him who 
had written it but said merely that it had been “confided to me by a 
particular Freind, whose Name I am not at Liberty to mention.”241  
Mason urged Washington to sign the petition.  Although Washington 
declined, his letter explaining why reveals a significant aspect of 
Washington’s thoughts on the relationship between religion and 
government. 
Washington began by saying that he did not object in principle to a 
tax to support religious teaching, as long as minority religions were 
provided appropriate exemptions: 
Altho’ no mans sentiments are more opposed to any kind of 
restraint upon religious principles than mine are; yet I must 
confess, that I am not amongst the number of those who are so 
much alarmed at the thoughts of making people pay towards the 
support of that which they profess, if of the denominations of 
Christians; or declare themselves Jews, Mahomitans or 
otherwise, & thereby obtain proper relief. 242 
Nonetheless, Washington continued, he did not believe the 
assessment bill was good for Virginia, and he actually hoped that the bill 
would be defeated: “As the matter now stands, I wish an assessment had 
 
237.  See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 
(June 20, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295 (Robert A. Rutland & William 
M.E. Rachal eds., 1973). 
238.  See id. at 298. 
239.  Id. at 299. 
240.  Id. 
241.  Letter from George Mason to George Washington (Oct. 2, 1785), in 3 THE PAPERS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 290, 290 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy 
Twohig eds., 1994) [hereinafter 3 PGW: CONFEDERATION SERIES]. 
242.  Letter from George Washington to George Mason (Oct. 3, 1785), in 3 PGW: 
CONFEDERATION SERIES, supra note 241, at 292, 292–93 (emphasis omitted).  At the time of 
Washington’s letter, he had not yet read Madison’s petition, and he told Mason that he 
intended to read “with attention.”  Id. at 292 (emphasis omitted). 
 2015] THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “GOD” 1079 
never been agitated—& as it has gone so far, that the Bill could die an 
easy death; because I think it will be productive of more quiet to the 
State, than by enacting it into a Law . . . .”243  In light of the strong 
opposition of a “respectable minority,” Washington warned, passage of 
the bill would “rankle, & perhaps convulse the State.”244  
Washington’s letter reveals a deep awareness of the dangers of 
political strife that can be caused by an insensitive intermingling of 
government and religion.245  As historian Paul Boller noted, “The 
agitation over the Virginia assessment plan seems to have convinced 
him, once and for all, of the impracticality of all proposals of this kind 
for state support of religion.”246  A few years later, as President, 
Washington would write that “[r]eligious controversies are always 
productive of more acrimony and irreconcilable hatreds than those 
which spring from any other cause.”247  
While serving as Commander-in-Chief during the Revolutionary 
War, Washington had occasionally used explicit Christian references in 
his writing to the troops.  In 1776, he urged the soldiers to “attend 
carefully upon religious exercises” and stated that he hoped that every 
officer “will endeavour so to live, and act, as becomes a Christian 
Soldier defending the dearest Rights and Liberties of his country.”248  In 
1778, he told his troops that while they were “zealously performing the 
 
243.  Id. at 293. 
244.  Id. 
245.  Madison included a similar concern in his Memorial and Remonstrance.  One of the 
reasons he listed to oppose the tax was that it would “destroy that moderation and harmony 
which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has produced among its 
several sects.”  Madison, supra note 237, at 302.  Making an argument very similar to 
Washington’s, Madison stated that  
[t]he very appearance of the Bill has transformed “that Christian forbearance, love 
and charity,” which of late mutually prevailed, into animosities and jealousies, which 
may not soon be appeased.  What mischiefs may not be dreaded, should this enemy 
to the public quiet be armed with the force of a law? 
Id. at 303 (quoting VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16). 
246.  PAUL F. BOLLER, JR., GEORGE WASHINGTON AND RELIGION 122 (1963). 
247.  Letter from George Washington to Edward Newenham (June 22, 1792), in 10 THE 
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 493, 493 (Robert F. Haggard & 
Mark A. Mastromarino eds., 2002). 
248.  General Orders (July 9, 1776), in 5 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: 
REVOLUTIONARY WAR SERIES 245, 246 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy Twohig eds., 1993) 
(footnote omitted). 
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duties of good Citizens and soldiers,” they should also “add the more 
distinguished Character of Christian.”249 
Washington’s most famous Christian reference came at the end of 
one of his final acts as commander in chief.  On June 8, 1783, he wrote a 
letter, generally referred to as the “Circular Letter,” to the thirteen state 
governors to convince them of the need for the individual states to cede 
more power to a central government.250  He ended his thirty-six page 
letter with a plea that everyone demean themselves “with that Charity, 
humility and pacific temper of mind, which were the Characteristicks of 
the Divine Author of our blessed Religion.”251   
According to historian Paul Boller, this description of the “humility” 
of “the Divine Author of our blessed Religion” is “unmistakably a 
reference to Jesus Christ.”252  The final paragraph of Washington’s long 
missive was deeply pious, a clearly Christian ending to his call to the 
governors for a stronger national government.   
This was, however, the last official utterance in which Washington 
employed Christian terminology.  As President, whenever he used 
religious discourse in his public communication, he carefully, and 
without exception, chose inclusive, nonsecular language. 
One can see the radical change in Washington’s writing by 
comparing his Presidential Thanksgiving proclamations with one from 
the Continental Congress twelve years earlier.  Under the Articles of 
Confederation, Congress truly represented the states.  The 
Confederation Congress, like the Continental Congress that preceded it, 
largely accepted the consensus view among the states that government 
should endorse and support the Protestant faith.253  Between June 12, 
1775, and October 11, 1782, Congress appointed a dozen days for either 
fasting, prayer, or thanksgiving,254 and most were decidedly sectarian.  
The November 1, 1777, Thanksgiving Day proclamation, drafted by Sam 
 
249.  General Orders (May 2, 1778), in 15 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: 
REVOLUTIONARY WAR SERIES 13, 13 (Edward G. Lengel ed., 2006). 
250.  George Washington, Circular to the States (June 8, 1783), in 26 THE WRITINGS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON: FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745–1799, at 483, 
485 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1938).  See generally 5 DOUGLASS SOUTHALL FREEMAN, 
GEORGE WASHINGTON: A BIOGRAPHY 446 (1952). 
251.  Washington, supra note 250, at 496. 
252.  BOLLER, supra note 246, at 71. 
253.  See DEREK H. DAVIS, RELIGION AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORIGINAL INTENT 84–88 (2000). 
254.  See id.  The fast days were usually in the spring, while the days for thanksgiving 
were in the autumn.  Id. at 84. 
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Adams, began by dictating to each individual citizen that it was “the 
indispensable duty of all men to adore the superintending providence of 
Almighty God.”255  All of “the good people” of the United States were 
urged to “join the penitent confession of their manifold sins, whereby 
they had forfeited every favour, and their humble and earnest 
supplication that it may please God, through the merits of Jesus Christ, 
mercifully to forgive and blot them out of remembrance.”256  In addition 
to military success and good harvests, the citizenry was urged to ask 
God “to prosper the means of religion for the promotion and 
enlargement of that kingdom which consisteth ‘in righteousness, peace 
and joy in the Holy Ghost.’”257 
By contrast, when Washington issued his Thanksgiving Day 
proclamation on October 3, 1789, he carefully chose non-sectarian, 
religiously inclusive, language.258  Unlike the 1777 proclamation, 
Washington did not command each individual to pray; rather, he said it 
was “the duty of all Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty 
God.”259  Instead of following Sam Adams’ example of referring to 
“Jesus Christ” and “the Holy Ghost,” Washington chose the far more 
inclusive phraseology such as “Almighty God.”260 
Some, like Justice Scalia, assume that Washington’s use of the word 
“God” refers to “inescapably the God of monotheism.”261  A return to 
the battle over the religious tax in Virginia reveals the error in that 
assumption. 
 
255.  Samuel Adams, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation (Nov. 1, 1777), in 9 JOURNALS OF 
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 854, 854–55 (1907). 
256.  Id. at 855. 
257.  Id. (quoting Romans 14:17 (King James)). 
258.  According to one historian, “This first national thanksgiving proclamation under 
the Constitution had been written by William Jackson, one of Washington’s secretaries, and 
approved by Washington with only one minor revision.”  BOLLER, supra note 246, at 62–63. 
259.  George Washington, Thanksgiving Proclamation (October 3, 1789), in 4 THE 
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 131, 131 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 
1993) [hereinafter 4 PGW]. 
260.  Id.  Later in the Proclamation, Washington used a different religious phrase, 
recommending that people be devoted “to the service of that great and glorious Being, who is 
the beneficent Author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be.”  Id. at 131–32. 
261.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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C. Defining “God” 
After Patrick Henry’s proposal to fund Christian teachers died in 
Committee, Madison realized that the arguments against the religious 
tax had altered the mood in the legislature.  On October 31, 1785, he 
presented to the legislature a bill Jefferson had drafted six years earlier, 
the “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.”262 
A heated battle arose over the section of the preamble to the bill, in 
which Jefferson had written that, “[whereas] Almighty God hath created 
the mind free, . . . all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments 
or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of 
hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy 
Author of our religion.”263  According to Jefferson’s autobiography, an 
amendment was proposed to add the phrase “‘Jesus Christ,’ so that it 
should read ‘a departure from the plan of Jesus Christ, the holy author 
of our religion.’”264 
Even though this amendment would not have altered the substance 
of the bill, Madison saw it as a threat to the principle of universal 
freedom of religion.  If the legislature had spoken of “Jesus Christ, the 
holy author of our religion,” Madison feared that this would “imply a 
restriction of the liberty defined in the Bill, to those professing his 
religion only.”265 
The amendment was defeated, and Jefferson’s reaction is significant 
in illustrating how he viewed the relationship between religious 
language and universal freedom.  Although his preamble had contained 
phrases such as “Almighty God,” “Holy Author of our religion,” and 
“Lord both of body and mind,” he did not interpret those phrases as 
excluding anyone.266  The omission of explicitly Christian language from 
the law, he wrote, proved that the legislature, “meant to comprehend, 
within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the 
Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and infidel of every 
 
262.  Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and Bills Number 82–86 of the Revision of 
the Laws of Virginia, 1776–1786: New Light on the Jeffersonian Model of Church-State 
Relations, 69 N.C. L. REV. 159, 159–160, 166–68, 183 (1990); see also H.J. ECKENRODE, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE REVOLUTION 113 (1910). 
263.  ECKENRODE, supra note 262, at 114–15. 
264.  THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 1, 62 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, The Knickerbocker Press 1892). 
265.  Madison, Detatched Memoranda, supra note 77, at 556. 
266.  See ECKENRODE, supra note 262, at 114–15. 
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denomination.”267  Thus, language such as “Almighty God” and “holy 
author of our religion” did not disregard, but encompassed, the belief 
systems of both the polytheistic Hindu268 and the “unbeliever” infidel.269 
The Framers were not unique is seeing that the word “God” could 
have meaning far beyond monotheism, even when, in the words of 
Justice Scalia, the word was written “in the singular, and with a capital 
G.”270  For example, anthropologist and mythologist Joseph Campbell 
stated that “God is a metaphor for a mystery that absolutely transcends 
all categories of human thought. . . .  It’s as simple as that.”271  
Philosopher John Dewey described the “active relation between ideal 
and actual to which [he] would give the name ‘God.’”272  Author Paul 
Tillich meanwhile introduced the concept of a “God above the God of 
theism.”273  It is, indeed, accurate to say that today, as at the time of the 
framing, “the symbol ‘God’ has many meanings, some of which have 
nothing to do with a supernatural creator of the universe.”274 
The leading Framers took advantage of the multiple meanings of 
“God” to create language that was deliberately theologically equivocal.  
They were not denying the obvious religious meaning, but adding to it: 
“religious terms need not lose their religious content when nonreligious 
meaning is added.”275  Their goal was to produce language that could be 
embraced by those with orthodox religious views but still permit all 
others to feel included.   
While this would be the way that Presidents Washington, Jefferson, 
and Madison addressed the population, there was one work produced 
by the Continental Congress that also embodied this tactic: The 
 
267.  JEFFERSON, supra note 264, at 62. 
268.  While the actual characterization of the Hindu religion as polytheistic is somewhat 
controversial, that is undoubtedly how the English government saw it.  See MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 311 (2008). 
269.  According to a leading dictionary of Jefferson’s time, the word “infidel” meant 
“[a]n unbeliever; a miscreant; a pagan; one who rejects Christianity.”  1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 537 (7th ed. abr., London, 1783). 
270.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
271.  Garry Abrams, Conversation with Joseph Cambell/On Mythology, L.A. TIMES, 
May 27, 1987, at G1 (alteration in original) (quoting THE HERO’S JOURNEY: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAIT (Holoform Research Inc. 1987)). 
272.  JOHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH 51 (1934) (emphasis omitted). 
273.  “The God above the God of theism is present, although hidden, in every divine-
human encounter.”  PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE 187 (2d ed. 2000). 
274.  Bruce Ledewitz, Toward a Meaning-Full Establishment Clause Neutrality, 87 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 725, 751 (2012). 
275.  Id. at 752. 
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Declaration of Independence.  Despite its unmistakably religious 
language, the document was carefully designed to be inclusive. 
Thomas Jefferson wrote the first draft of the Declaration of 
Independence and began with a religious reference that largely 
remained in the final version: 
When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for a 
people to advance from that subordination in which they have 
hitherto remained, & to assume among the powers of the earth 
the equal & independent station to which the laws of nature & of 
nature’s god entitle them . . . .276 
The phrase “laws of nature and of nature’s god” is associated with 
eighteenth century deism, a “rather vague Enlightenment-era belief . . . 
in a Creator whose divine handiwork was evident in the wonders of 
nature” but not “a personal God who interceded directly in the daily 
affairs of mankind.”277 
Jefferson’s original draft did not contain the iconic phrase “endowed 
by their Creator.”  Instead, he had written: “We hold these Truths to be 
self evident; that all Men are created equal and independent; that from 
that equal Creation they derive Rights inherent and inalienable . . . .”278  
Jefferson’s draft was edited by the so-called Committee of Five, which 
consisted of Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger 
Sherman, and Robert Livingston.279  The committee changed the 
 
276.  1 Thomas Jefferson, Original Rough Draft of the Declaration of Independence, in 1 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 423, 423 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (emphasis added). 
277.  WALTER ISAACSON, AMERICAN SKETCHES: GREAT LEADERS, CREATIVE 
THINKERS, AND HEROES OF A HURRICANE 29 (2009); see also STEVEN WALDMAN, 
FOUNDING FAITH: PROVIDENCE, POLITICS, AND THE BIRTH OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 
AMERICA 88–89 (2008) (“This was the language of the Enlightenment theology that grew up 
in the eighteenth century as a result not only of philosophical innovations—John Locke, 
David Hume, and others—but also, more important, of scientific innovations.”).  Whether 
Jefferson himself was a “deist” is a matter of some dispute.  Compare William D. Gould, The 
Religious Opinions of Thomas Jefferson, 20 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 191, 199 (1933) 
(“Jefferson was not a deist. . . .  [H]e was a decided Unitarian.”), with 3 DUMAS MALONE, 
JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 481 (1962) 
(“Actually, he was a deist, not an atheist.”). 
278.  Thomas Jefferson, First Draft of the Declaration of Independence, reprinted in 
5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 491, 492 (1906) (emphasis added).  The word 
“inalienable” in Jefferson’s draft was changed to “unalienable” in the final draft, but it is 
believed that this was of no great significance.  See Stephen E. Lucas, Justifying America: The 
Declaration of Independence as a Rhetorical Document, in AMERICAN RHETORIC: CONTEXT 
AND CRITICISM 67, 124 n.50 (Thomas W. Benson ed., 1989).  Some suspect that it might well 
have been a printer’s error that was never authorized by Congress.  Id. 
279.  Lucas, supra note 278, at 71–72. 
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language on human rights into a form which is much closer to its final 
version: “We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
inherent & inalienable rights . . . .”280 
The word “Creator” has been claimed by some partisans to support 
a particular religious belief: “Clearly, the signers of the Declaration of 
Independence believed that God must be acknowledged and ‘that all 
men were created equal’ and ‘endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights’ . . . .”281  That view ignores the nuance of the 
Framers’ language.  In truth, this language “is highly ambiguous in its 
theological groundings.”282  The word Creator simultaneously fit into a 
wide range of religious beliefs.  Deists, who viewed the concept of “God 
as a first cause,”283 frequently referred to “God” as “the Creator.”284  Yet 
the term was also utilized by the orthodox religions of the time: 
Congregational Minister and Yale president Timothy Dwight delivered 
a sermon stating that the Bible contained “as full a proof, that Christ is 
the Creator, [and] . . . that the Creator is God.”285 
 
280.  Jefferson, supra note 278, at 492 (struck language omitted). 
281.  Roy S. Moore, Religion in the Public Square, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 347, 349 (1999) 
(quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)). 
282.  Daniel J. Morrissey, The Separation of Church and State: An American-Catholic 
Perspective, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 43 (1997). 
283.  ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 118 (updated ed. 
2005). 
284.  ALF J. MAPP, JR., THE FAITHS OF OUR FATHERS: WHAT AMERICA’S FOUNDERS 
REALLY BELIEVED 7 (paperback ed. 2005). 
285.  TIMOTHY DWIGHT, Sermon XXXIX: Divinity of Christ.—Objections Answered., in 
2 THEOLOGY; EXPLAINED AND DEFENDED IN A SERIES OF SERMONS 5, 9 (New York, G. & 
C. Carvill 5th ed. 1828).  In its final edit, the Continental Congress added two further religious 
references to the Declaration of Independence: 
We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in General 
Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the Rectitude 
of our Intentions, do, . . . Declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right 
ought to be Free and Independent States . . . .  And for the support of this 
Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually 
pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor. 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).  The phrases 
added by Congress—“appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world” and “protection of 
divine Providence”—are widely interpreted as being more traditionally religious than the 
earlier two religious references.  Historian Pauline Maier describes Congress as adding “two 
references to God, which were conspicuously missing in Jefferson’s draft.”  PAULINE MAIER, 
AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 148–49 (1997).  
Nonetheless, even after the congressional editing, the religious language in the final version of 
the Declaration of Independence remains inclusive.  According to historian Steven Waldman, 
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As President, Washington followed the practice embodied in the 
Declaration of Independence of offering public expressions of religion 
that were devout but capable of being accepted by a wide, if not endless, 
variety of belief systems.  His Inaugural Address, for example, like his 
subsequent Thanksgiving Address, was replete with explicitly religious 
but carefully inclusive language.   
Although Washington avoided using the word “God,” the Address 
began with a direct religious “supplication”: “[I]t would be peculiarly 
improper to omit in this first official Act, my fervent supplications to 
that Almighty Being who rules over the Universe, who presides in the 
Councils of Nations, and whose providential aids can supply every 
human defect.”286  After this pious opening, he reminded his audience of 
the role that he believed that divine intervention had played in their 
victory over the British: 
No People can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible 
hand, which conducts the Affairs of men more than the People of 
the United States.  Every step, by which they have advanced to 
the character of an independent nation, seems to have been 
distinguished by some token of providential agency.287 
At the close of the Address, Washington returned to his religious 
theme: 
I shall take my present leave; but not without resorting once 
more to the benign Parent of the human race, in humble 
supplication that . . . this divine blessing may be equally 
conspicuous in the enlarged views—the temperate consultations, 
and the wise measures on which the success of this Government 
must depend.288 
To appreciate the care with which the Inaugural Address was 
crafted, one can compare the final product with the first draft that had 
 
“the term Divine Providence was one the Deists could accept, because it left the door open 
for God to work either directly and personally or through the laws of nature.”  WALDMAN, 
supra note 277, at 89.  The phrases are not specifically Protestant or Christian; perhaps, as one 
commentator has asserted, they “unambiguously derive from Judaism.”  MICHAEL NOVAK, 
ON TWO WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 17 
(2002). 
286.  George Washington, First Inaugural Address (April 30, 1789), in 2 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 152, 173–74 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1987). 
287.  Id. 
288.  Id. at 176–77 (emphasis omitted). 
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been prepared by Washington’s secretary David Humphreys.289  
Humphreys had wanted Washington to use explicitly Christian language 
referencing “[t]he blessed Religion revealed in the word of God.”290 
Although the final Address contains much religious imagery, it 
includes nothing that is uniquely Christian.  Additionally, Humphreys’s 
draft of Washington’s remarks “included a short space for a prayer that 
was to be introduced after the first paragraph.”291  On the day of the 
inauguration, prayers were indeed given, but they were not led by the 
President.  Instead, they were conducted by Senate chaplain Samuel 
Provoost during “divine services,” held at Saint Paul’s Church, after the 
Inaugural Address.292 
Washington’s Farewell Address was written with the same sort of 
inclusive religious language as the Inaugural Address.  The final version 
of the Farewell Address was primarily drafted by Alexander Hamilton, 
with Washington providing some crucial editorial changes.293  A 
 
289.  Washington asked James Madison to review Humphreys’s seventy-three page 
draft.  Letter from George Washington to James Madison (Feb. 16, 1789), in 11 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 446, 446 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977).  Madison 
expressed his disdain for the work, which he later described as “so strange a production,” 
Correspondence with James Madison, in 2 THE LIFE & WRITINGS OF JARED SPARKS 208, 
212–13 (Herbert B. Adams ed., Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1893), and proceeded to 
draft a completely new speech, Washington, supra note 286, at 153–54. 
290.  Washington, supra note 286, at 166.  Jared Sparks, the original editor of The 
Writings of George Washington, had destroyed the version of Humphreys’s draft that 
Washington had hand copied.  Sparks cut the seventy-three pages into small pieces and gave 
them to people who wanted something with Washington’s handwriting.  See id. at 152–53.  
The twentieth century editors of The Papers of George Washington were able to reassemble 
small portions of the original, one of which read: “The blessed Religion revealed in the word 
of God will remain an eternal and awful monument to prove that the best Institutions may be 
abused by human depravity; and that they may even, in some instances be made subservient 
to the vilest of purposes.”  Id. at 166. 
291.  Correspondence with James Madison, supra note 289, at 211. 
292.  Washington, supra note 286, at 154–55. 
293.  When Washington had considered stepping down in 1792, at the close of his first 
term, he asked Madison to write a draft of a “valedictory.”  FELIX GILBERT, TO THE 
FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF EARLY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 124–25 (1961).  Four 
years later, having become alienated from both Madison and Jefferson due to bitter political 
differences over issues such as the National Bank and Jay’s Treaty, Washington asked 
Hamilton for help revising Madison’s draft.  On May 15, 1796, Washington sent Hamilton a 
copy of Madison’s draft, as well as a note describing some of the points he wanted to add.  
Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (May 15, 1796), in 20 PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 174, 175 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974) [hereinafter 20 PAH].  
Hamilton rewrote the Address and, on July 30, sent his new draft to Washington.  Letter from 
Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (July 30, 1796), in 20 PAH, supra at 264, 264–65.  
Hamilton kept much of Madison’s introductory language and conclusion but added an 
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comparison between Hamilton’s language and that finally used by 
Washington demonstrates Washington’s insistence on using inclusive 
public religious language.  With minimal stylistic modifications from 
Hamilton’s version, Washington wrote, “[L]et us with caution indulge 
the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion.  
Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on 
minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to 
expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious 
principle.”294 
In Hamilton’s draft, however, the statement foreshadowing the end 
of “national morality” without religion, was followed by a rhetorical 
question: “Does it not require the aid of a generally received and 
divinely authoritative Religion?”295  Washington deleted this entirely, 
thereby removing Hamilton’s attempt to add the explicitly Christian 
allusion to “received . . . religion.”296 
Throughout his presidency, Washington was determined that 
religious differences would not disrupt the new nation.  As writers 
Michael and Jana Novak noted, his goal was to find a way of 
communicating that “unites—rather than divides—a religiously 
pluralistic people.”297 
D. The Religious Language of Jefferson and Madison 
Despite the widespread view that Thomas Jefferson called for a 
“total separation” between religion and government,298 throughout his 
presidency he consciously employed religious language in a comparable 
manner to Washington.  He ended his first inaugural address, on March 
4, 1801, with a non-denominational religious plea similar in tone to that 
spoken by Washington: “[M]ay that Infinite Power which rules the 
 
extensive middle section discussing many of the contemporary political issues, such as the 
desirability of maintaining neutrality during the conflict between England and France.  See id. 
at 265–88. 
294.  WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
S. DOC. NO. 106-21, at 20 (2000). 
295.  Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, supra note 293, at 280. 
296.  Id. at 280 & n.22. 
297.  MICHAEL NOVAK & JANA NOVAK, WASHINGTON’S GOD: RELIGION, LIBERTY, 
AND THE FATHER OF OUR COUNTRY 14 (2006). 
298.  Robert L. Cord & Howard Ball, The Separation of Church and State: A Debate, 
1987 UTAH L. REV. 895, 913 (quoting FAWN M. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AN 
INTIMATE HISTORY 129 (1974)). 
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destinies of the universe, lead our councils to what is best, and give them 
a favorable issue for your peace and prosperity.”299 
Throughout his presidency, Jefferson would utilize similar religious 
language in his speeches.  In his second message to Congress, Jefferson 
declared that “our just attentions are first drawn to those pleasing 
circumstances which mark the goodness of that Being from whose favor 
they flow, and the large measure of thankfulness we owe for his 
bounty.”300  In his 1805 message to Congress, he noted there had been 
an outbreak of yellow fever but that “Providence in his goodness gave it 
an early termination on this occasion, and lessened the number of 
victims which have usually fallen before it.”301 
The major difference between the public religious language of 
Washington and Jefferson was that Jefferson refused to issue a 
Thanksgiving proclamation.  While Jefferson would employ non-
sectarian religious language himself, he opposed government officials 
even recommending that citizens engage in religious activity.  Such a 
recommendation by a president, he believed, carried an implicit threat.  
At minimum, he said, it would lead to “some degree of proscription, 
perhaps in public opinion.”302  Because “[f]asting & prayer are religious 
exercises” and “[e]very religious society has a right to determine for 
itself the times for these exercises, and the objects proper for them,” the 
right to call for days of thanksgiving, fasting, and prayer “can never be 
safer than in their own hands, where the constitution has deposited 
it.”303 
When James Madison became President, he too utilized inclusive, 
non-sectarian religious language.  For example, he concluded his First 
Inaugural Address in 1809 with a devout entreaty to 
the guardianship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose 
power regulates the destiny of nations, whose blessings have 
 
299.  Thomas Jefferson, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 1, 5 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, Riker, Thorne & Co. 1854) 
[hereinafter 8 WTJ]. 
300.  Thomas Jefferson, Second Annual Message (Dec. 15, 1802), in 8 WTJ, supra note 
299, at 15, 15. 
301.  Thomas Jefferson, Fifth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1805), in 8 WTJ, supra note 299, 
at 46, 46. 
302.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Mr. Millar (Jan. 23, 1808), in 4 MEMOIRS, 
CORRESPONDENCE AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 106, 106 (Thomas 
Jefferson Randolph ed., London, Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley 1829). 
303.  Id. at 106–07. 
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been so conspicuously dispensed to this rising Republic, and to 
whom we are bound to address our devout gratitude for the past, 
as well as our fervent supplications and best hopes for the 
future.304 
Earlier in the Address, Madison had announced as one of his guiding 
principles his commitment “to avoid the slightest interference with the 
rights of conscience, or the functions of religion so wisely exempted 
from civil jurisdiction.”305  Like Jefferson, Madison did not see the use of 
religious language in official speeches as violating the principle of 
separation of Church and State.  To both Jefferson and Madison, fidelity 
to that principle did not require the purging of all religious language 
from public dialogue. 
Unlike Jefferson, Madison issued several recommendations that the 
public engage in days of thanksgivings and fasts, though later in life 
Madison expressed his strong objections to such presidential 
recommendations.  As President, Madison felt compelled to issue his 
proclamations by the necessity of building public support for the War of 
1812.  This was an unpopular war; the vote for the official declaration of 
war, 79–49 in the House of Representatives and 19–13 “in the Senate—
was the closest vote on any declaration of war in American history.”306  
Less than a month after the war began, Madison, “in response to a 
specific request by both houses of Congress, . . . issued the first of his 
four religious proclamations.”307  His July 9 proclamation was a call for 
“a day of public Humiliation and Prayer.”308  Among the activities 
Madison recommended were “rendering to the Sovereign of the 
Universe, and the Benefactor of mankind, the public homage due to his 
holy attributes” and “acknowledging the transgressions which might 
justly provoke the manifestations of His divine displeasure.”309 
 
304.  James Madison, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1809) [hereinafter Madison, First 
Inaugural], in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 15, 17–18 (Robert 
A. Rutland & Thomas A. Mason eds., 1984).  Interestingly, he did not use any religious 
imagery in his Second Inaugural.  See James Madison, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 
1813), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 85 (Angela Kreider ed., 
2008) [hereinafter 6 PJM]. 
305.  Madison, First Inaugural, supra note 304, at 17. 
306.  DONALD R. HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812: A SHORT HISTORY 16 (1995). 
307.  MEYERSON, supra note 59, at 222. 
308.  James Madison, Presidential Proclamation (July 9, 1812), in 4 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 581, 581 (J.C.A. Stagg ed., 1999). 
309.  Id. at 581. 
 2015] THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “GOD” 1091 
After he left office, Madison explained to a friend that when he 
issued a religious proclamation he was “always careful to make the 
Proclamations absolutely indiscriminate, and merely recommendatory; 
or rather mere designations of a day, on which all who thought proper 
might unite in consecrating it to religious purposes, according to their 
own faith & forms.”310  Accordingly, in his first proclamation, Madison 
stated his hope that his “recommendation” would “enable the several 
religious denominations and societies so disposed, to offer, at one and 
the same time, their common vows and adorations to Almighty God.”311 
Madison was more explicit in his second proclamation one year 
later.  He began by “recommending to all, who shall be piously disposed 
to unite . . . in addressing, at one and the same time, their vows and 
adorations, to the great Parent and Sovereign of the Universe,” who, 
Madison said, had blessed the United States with the “sacred rights of 
conscience.”312  Even with such a commitment to “freewill offerings,” 
Madison never accepted that such proclamations, including his own, 
were appropriate.  In his so-called “Detatched Memoranda,” a 
collection of private papers written sometime after he left office in 
1817,313 Madison explained his opposition to religious proclamations, 
which, he said, “imply a religious agency, making no part of the trust 
delegated to political rulers.”314  According to Madison, calling these 
proclamations “advisory” did not ameliorate the problem since “[a]n 
advisory Govt is a contradiction in terms.”315  Madison warned that 
 
310.  Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), supra note 76, 
at 101 (emphasis omitted). 
311.  Madison, supra note 308, at 581 (emphasis added). 
312.  James Madison, A Proclamation (July 23, 1813), in 6 PJM, supra note 304, at 458, 
458–59.  His last two religious proclamations had similar, though less eloquent, disclaimers.  
His 1814 proclamation recommended that a day be set aside “on which all may have an 
opportunity of voluntarily offering at the same time in their respective religious assemblies 
their humble adoration to the Great Sovereign of the Universe.”  James Madison, 
Presidential Proclamation (Nov. 16, 1814), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 543, 543 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).  His final 
proclamation recommended that the people “of every religious denomination may in their 
solemn assemblies unite their hearts and their voices in a freewill offering to their Heavenly 
Benefactor of their homage of thanksgiving and of their songs of praise.”  James Madison, 
A Proclamation (Mar. 4, 1815), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS, supra, at 545, 546. 
313.  Madison, Detatched Memoranda, supra note 77. 
314.  Id. at 560. 
315.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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these proclamations “nourish the erron[e]ous idea of a national 
religion.”316 
E. The Failed Sectarian President 
Of the four presidents from the founding generation, only John 
Adams used sectarian religious language in his public addresses.  In his 
inaugural address, Adams described himself as having “a veneration for 
the religion of a people who profess and call themselves Christians, and 
a fixed resolution to consider a decent respect for Christianity among 
the best recommendations for the public service.”317  Thus, not only did 
Adams announce his own personal “veneration” for Christianity, he 
pledged to use a religious litmus test for governmental hiring in 
violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitutional ban on 
religious tests.318 
When Adams issued his two proclamations calling for days of 
“humiliation, fasting, and prayer,” he also employed sectarian, non-
inclusive language, drafted by the chaplains of Congress, the Reverends 
Bishop White and Ashbel Green.319  The first of these proclamations, 
issued March 23, 1798, was substantially “more overtly Christian than 
Washington’s.”320  Unlike Washington, who stated that it was “the duty 
of all Nations” to acknowledge God,321 Adams decreed that 
acknowledging God was each individual’s duty, declaring that it was “an 
indispensable duty, which the people owe to him.”322  Also differing 
from Washington, Adams employed explicitly Christian language in his 
recommendation that all citizens “offer their devout addresses to the 
Father of Mercies . . . , beseeching him at the same time, of his infinite 
 
316.  Madison spelled the word “erronious.”  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
317.  John Adams, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1797), in 1 THE ADDRESSES AND 
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: INAUGURAL, ANNUAL, AND 
SPECIAL, FROM 1789–1846, at 103, 106 (Edwin Williams ed., New York, Edward Walker 
1846). 
318.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (stating that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States”). 
319.  ASHBEL GREEN, THE LIFE OF ASHBEL GREEN, V.D.M. 270–71 (Joseph H. Hones 
ed., New York, Robert Carter & Bros. 1849). 
320.  2 JAMES HITCHCOCK, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE 
30 (2004). 
321.  Washington, supra note 259, at 131. 
322.  John Adams, Official Proclamation for a National Fast (Mar. 23, 1798), in 9 THE 
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 169, 169 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co. 
1854). 
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grace, through the Redeemer of the world, freely to remit all our 
offences, and to incline us, by his Holy Spirit.”323 
According to Ashbel Green, even this language was not enough to 
prevent the complaint that “the religious community of our country had 
made, namely, that the proclamation . . . lacked a decidedly Christian 
spirit.”324  Accordingly, Green said, when Adams requested a second 
proclamation a year later, “I resolved to write one of an evangelical 
character.”325  The 1799 proclamation begins with a reference to the 
lessons of the “Volume of Inspiration” and calls for the citizens of the 
nation to 
call to mind our numerous offenses against the Most High God, 
confess them before Him with the sincerest penitence, implore 
His pardoning mercy, through the Great Mediator and 
Redeemer, for our past transgressions, and that through the 
grace of His Holy Spirit we may be disposed and enabled to yield 
a more suitable obedience to His righteous requisitions in time to 
come.326 
This time, the “religious community” was enthusiastic in praise.  
John Mitchell Mason, a Presbyterian minister, applauded Adams for 
displaying support, “in one of his proclamations, to a number of the 
most precious truths of Revelation.”327  Adams’s political opponents, 
however, saw these overt religious declarations as fundamentally 
illegitimate; many religious groups viewed them as “Federalist plots to 
ensnare Republicans into praying for John Adams.”328 
After losing his bid for re-election to Jefferson, Adams blamed his 
loss on his religious proclamations: “The National Fast, recommended 
by me turned me out of office.”329  According to Adams, the fear that he 
 
323.  Id. at 169–70. 
324.  GREEN, supra note 319, at 270. 
325.  Id. 
326.  John Adams, Proclamation (Mar. 6, 1799), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 284, 284–85 (James D. Richardson ed., 
Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1896). 
327.  JOHN MITCHELL MASON, THE VOICE OF WARNING TO CHRISTIANS (New York, 
n.p. 1800), reprinted in  POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–
1805, at 1447, 1469 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991). 
328.  Perry Miller, From the Covenant to the Revival, in 1 RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE: 
THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 322, 357 (James Ward Smith & A. Leland Jamison 
eds., 1961). 
329.  Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (June 12, 1812), in OLD FAMILY 
LETTERS 391, 392 (Alexander Biddle ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1892). 
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was supporting the Presbyterian Church as it “aimed at an 
Establishment as a National Church” both “allarmed and alienated 
Quakers, Anabaptists, Mennonists, Moravians, Swedenborgians, 
Methodists, Catholicks, protestant Episcopalians, Arians, Socinians, 
Armenians, &c, &c, &c, Atheists and Deists might be added.”330  The 
strong desire to avoid a sectarian President, Adams said, “is at the 
bottom of the unpopularity of national Fasts and Thanksgiving.”331  The 
lesson that Adams drew was clear: “Nothing is more dreaded than the 
National Government meddling with Religion.”332 
V. LEARNING FROM THE FRAMERS 
A. Speaking to All Americans 
The framing generation did not construct a philosophy of the proper 
relationship between religion and government in a simplistic way.  The 
intellectual compromise of the framing generation reflects a 
sophisticated balance.  They believed that genuine, devout 
governmental religious speech was to be permitted.  But unlike the 
unrestricted religious speech of the citizenry, the religious speech of the 
government was to be strictly limited.  The critically important aspect of 
the framing generation’s compromise was that only the most general, 
non-sectarian reference to God was deemed appropriate. 
The Framers understood from history that religious oppression does 
not come from a simple belief in God; it arises when a sectarian view of 
God finds its voice and power in an institution or group that deems itself 
the sole interpreter of divine will.  Accordingly, the Framers decided 
that the American government should not acknowledge religion in a 
way that favored any particular creed, denomination, or group of 
denominations.  They were not afraid of a public offering containing 
truly religious expression.  Yet they strove to find a civil vocabulary that 
could encompass all people, regardless of their faith. 
This understanding of the Framers’ view of religious freedom reveals 
the flaws in Justice Scalia’s defense of the posting of copies of the Ten 
Commandments inside Kentucky courthouses.  According to Justice 
 
330.  Id. 
331.  Id. at 393.  According to Adams, all of the different groups he named believed, 
“Let us have Jefferson, Madison, Burr, any body, whether they be Philosophers, Deists, or 
even Atheists, rather than a Presbyterian President.”  Id. at 392–93. 
332.  Id. at 393. 
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Scalia, “Publicly honoring the Ten Commandments is . . . 
indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against other religions is 
concerned, from publicly honoring God.”333  Justice Scalia based his 
conclusion on the fact that “[t]he three most popular religions in the 
United States, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—which combined 
account for 97.7% of all believers—are monotheistic.  All of them, 
moreover (Islam included), believe that the Ten Commandments were 
given by God to Moses, and are divine prescriptions for a virtuous 
life.”334 
Justice Scalia concluded that since honoring both the Ten 
Commandments and God “are recognized across such a broad and 
diverse range of the population—from Christians to Muslims—that they 
cannot be reasonably understood as a government endorsement of a 
particular religious viewpoint.”335 
There are numerous problems with this analysis, starting from his 
apparent assumption that “97.7% of all believers . . . believe that the 
Ten Commandments were given by God to Moses, and are divine 
prescriptions for a virtuous life.”336  First, Justice Scalia’s equating of the 
number of Christians, Jews, and Muslims with the number of people 
who believe in the divinity of the Ten Commandments presumes the 
untenable conclusion that every person who is a member of a religion 
believes in all of its tenets.337  Second, using as his statistical base the 
number of “all believers,” rather than “all citizens,” deliberately ignores 
the sensibilities and interests of a sizable portion of the population.338 
Most important, perhaps, is that Justice Scalia’s arithmetic analysis 
was rejected by the Framers, in particular George Washington.  During 
Washington’s presidency, the percentage of Protestants in the country 
 
333.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
334.  Id. (citation omitted) (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: 2004–2005, at 55 tbl.67 (2004)). 
335.  Id. 
336.  Id.; see MEYERSON, supra note 59, at 270. 
337.  For example, 45% of U.S. Catholics supported legalized abortion in a 2009 survey.  
See Support for Abortion Slips: Issue Ranks Lower on the Agenda, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
(Oct. 1, 2009), http://people-press.org/report/549/support-for-abortion-slips, archived at http://
perma.cc/EM48-XV85. 
338.  It also ignores “Hindus and Buddhists, rapidly growing segments of American 
society, [who] are very upset about some displays that denigrate them.”  NUSSBAUM, supra 
note 268, at 269.  Nussbaum also points out that “[e]ven Muslims, Jews, and Roman Catholics, 
moreover, would not approve of the Protestant version of the commandments, which is the one 
in question here.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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was as high, if not higher, than the 97.7% figure for Christians, Jews, and 
Muslims relied on by Justice Scalia.  According to one estimate, as of 
1776, Protestants made up 98.1% of all congregations in the nation, with 
Catholics at 1.7% and Jews at .2%.339  If Washington had followed 
Justice Scalia’s logic, he would have utilized strictly Protestant language 
in his proclamations; to be safe he could have used Christian 
terminology to be in keeping with the beliefs of 99.8% of the 
populations.  Of course, Washington did not.  He deliberately chose 
non-denominational language.340  His goal was that the “National 
Government, which by the favor of Divine Providence, was formed by 
the common Counsels, and peaceably established with the common 
consent of the People, will prove a blessing to every denomination of 
them.”341 
Unlike Justice Scalia, Washington was not content to use 
denominational speech merely because it was “recognized across . . . a 
broad and diverse range of the population.”342  Washington’s vision for 
the nation was far more inclusive: “The bosom of America is open to 
receive,” he wrote, “the oppressed and persecuted of all nations and 
religions; whom we shall welcome to a participation of all our rights and 
privileges, if by decency and propriety of conduct, they appear to merit 
the enjoyment.”343 
B. Establishing the Framers’ Compromise 
The Framers, however, did not believe that this universal welcome 
required the avoidance of all public religious language.  Their use of 
theologically equivocal language was a deliberate attempt to create a 
pious public vocabulary that could be shared, albeit in different ways, by 
those possessing the full range of religious beliefs.  Those from orthodox 
religions could see this public language not simply as consistent with 
their own language of worship but actually as part of it.  The Framers’ 
 
339.  Rodney Stark & Roger Finke, American Religion in 1776: A Statistical Portrait, 49 
SOC. ANALYSIS 39, 49 tbl.5 (1988). 
340.  NOVAK & NOVAK, supra note 297, at 14; see notes 286–96 and accompanying text. 
341.  Letter from George Washington to the Soc’y of Quakers (Oct. 1789), in 4 PGW, 
supra note 259, at 265, 265–66 (emphasis added). 
342.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
343.  Letter from George Washington to the Members of the Volunteer Ass’n, and 
Other Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Ir., Who Have Lately Arrived in the City of N.Y. (Dec. 
2, 1783), quoted in JOHN B. DILLON, NOTES ON HISTORICAL EVIDENCE IN REFERENCE TO 
ADVERSE THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 74 (New York, S.W. Green 1871) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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religious language, though, was capacious enough to permit those 
outside the mainstream of the nation’s predominant religious belief 
systems to join in the experience of a conscientious communion with the 
rest of their nation.  This language was designed to communicate to all, 
including the deistic, agnostic, and atheistic, that they were each valued 
members of the political community. 
To take the lessons from the Framers’ practices and create a modern 
test for evaluating the constitutionality of governmental religious speech 
requires a subtle but significant modification of the endorsement test.  
That test is premised on the principle that “[e]ndorsement sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of 
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”344 
The framing generation shared the concern that all citizens, 
regardless of their religious beliefs, must be treated and valued as “full 
members of the political community.”345  But the Framers would not 
have agreed that every endorsement of religion communicated second-
class citizenship to non-adherents.  Carefully chosen, theologically 
equivocal phraseology can be seen as respecting all members of our 
pluralistic nation because the words are designed to be capable of 
multiple meanings.346  The inclusive, non-denominational religious 
language of Washington’s Thanksgiving Proclamation, Jefferson’s 
Statute for Religious Freedom, and Madison’s Inaugural Address was 
not considered divisive or insulting.  A workable test reflecting the 
Framers’ wisdom, then, would only view as unconstitutional 
governmental speech or practices that endorsed religion in such a way 
that it “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”347 
 
344.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Conner, J., concurring). 
345.  Id.; MEYERSON, supra note 59, at 272. 
346.  See, e.g., Ledewitz, supra note 274, at 753 (“[L]ike the Sunday closing laws, 
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long as it also contains a secular component.  In other words, if the government can plausibly 
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for Sunday closing laws did not remove a parallel secular justification.”). 
347.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Conner, J., concurring).  Mike Schaps, in trying to make 
sense out of the disparate opinions in the two Ten Commandment cases, created a summary 
similar to my proposed standard: “One may sketch the standard as follows: Government 
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While determining which endorsements of religion communicate 
such inappropriate messages will not always be simple, the path created 
by the Framers can provide some important guidelines.  Sectarian 
governmental language, such as Kentucky’s posting of the Ten 
Commandments in the courthouse, would generally violate that 
standard.  Many common forms of governmental religious speech, those 
that rely on general, non-sectarian references to God, would pass this 
test. 
The phrase “one Nation under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance and 
the national motto, “In God We Trust,” for example, would be entirely 
permissible.  Properly viewed, those phrases are not “a profession of a 
religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism.”348  Rather, they are 
perfectly consistent with the inclusive, non-sectarian language of the 
Framers.  They are functionally the same as Thomas Jefferson’s Statute 
for Religious Freedom that began with the phrase “Whereas Almighty 
God hath created the mind free.”349 
The invocation that precedes sessions of the Supreme Court, “God 
save the United States and this Honorable Court,” also is not 
problematic.  It should not be considered “the government’s 
endorsement of a transcendent, monotheistic, Judeo-Christian God.”350  
Instead, it would be treated as consistent with the non-sectarian 
language of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison.  By contrast, it would 
be unconstitutional for a court to begin its sessions, as one did in North 
Carolina, with the judge saying,  
Let us pause for a moment of prayer . . . .  O Lord, our God, our 
Father in Heaven, we pray this morning that you will place your 
divine guiding hand on this courtroom . . . .  Let truth be heard 
 
cannot favor one religion over another, or act to benefit religion over nonreligion, unless a 
government practice promotes nonsectarian religion only slightly and is so deeply woven into 
our national traditions that enjoining it would be highly divisive.”  Mike Schaps, Comment, 
Vagueness as a Virtue: Why the Supreme Court Decided the Ten Commandments Cases 
Inexactly Right, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2006) (emphasis omitted). 
348.  Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004). 
349.  An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, ch. 34 (1786), in 12 THE STATUTES AT 
LARGE BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION 
OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 84 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, 
George Cochran 1823) (capitalization omitted).  See also George Washington’s Thanksgiving 
Day Proclamation, asserting the nation’s duty “to acknowledge the providence of Almighty 
God.”  Washington, supra note 259, at 131. 
350.  Epstein, supra note 19, at 2144. 
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and wisdom be reflected in the light of your presence with us 
here today.  Amen.351 
The relevant difference between the two judicial statements can be seen 
in George Washington’s refusal to follow the Continental Congress’s 
practice of declaring it the “the indispensable duty of all men to adore 
the superintending providence of Almighty God.”352  Rather than 
directing the citizenry to pray, Washington stated it was “the duty of all 
Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God.”353  In the 
same spirit, Madison declared, “It is the duty of every man to render to 
the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable 
to him.”354  The Establishment Clause should reject any “exhortation 
from government to the people that they engage in religious conduct.”355 
Similarly, the practice of legislative prayer that was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Marsh should be limited to situations where the 
prayer is “directed at the legislators themselves.”356  By contrast, it 
should be unconstitutional for a city council, attended by citizens with 
business before the council, to open with a prayer that “urge[s] citizens 
to engage in religious practices.”357 
The Framers will not always be a sufficient guide for applying the 
proposed standard.  We know that the Framers studiously avoided 
sectarian governmental speech, but we cannot know precisely what they 
would have done with sectarian governmental displays that had been in 
place for a substantial time.  Nonetheless, such sectarian displays that 
post-date the founding period but are of long-standing lineage, such as 
the forty-year-old Ten Commandments display that was upheld in Van 
 
351.  N.C. Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1147 (4th 
Cir. 1991). 
352.  Adams, supra note 255, at 854. 
353.  Washington, supra note 259, at 131. 
354.  Madison, supra note 237, at 299. 
355.  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 n.52 (1989), abrogated by Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
356.  N.C. Civil Liberties Union, 947 F.2d at 1149. 
357.  Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603 n.52.  The Court in Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), held that prayer before a city council did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.  134 S. Ct. at 1813.  Justice Alito, in his concurrence, pointed out that 
the prayer at issue in the case occurred prior to “the ‘legislative’ portion of its agenda, during 
which residents were permitted to address the board.  After this portion of the meeting, a 
separate stage of the meetings was devoted to such matters as formal requests for variances.”  
Id. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring).  Accordingly, he stated, “I do not understand this case to 
involve the constitutionality of a prayer prior to what may be characterized as an adjudicatory 
proceeding.”  Id. 
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Orden or the treatment of Christmas as a national holiday,358 should not 
be considered violative of the Establishment Clause.  Despite their 
secular nature, the longevity of such sectarian displays will blunt the 
hostile message to non-adherents that the displays would have conveyed 
when originally created.359 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When the Establishment Clause was included in the First 
Amendment, it was seen as ensuring, in the words of James Madison, 
“the practical distinction between Religion & Civil Gov[ernmen]t” 
which was “essential to the purity of both.”360  Those who fought for the 
Establishment Clause considered the prevention of religious 
establishments to be an essential part of religious freedom.  The 
Reverend William Tennent, a South Carolina Presbyterian minister, 
who fought to disestablish the state’s Anglican Church, argued that the 
simple designation of a denomination as the “established church . . . 
operates as an abridgment of religious liberty.”361  Even if they are free 
to practice their own faith, Tennent argued, non-adherents “must at 
least submit to this inferiority, or rather bear the reproach of the law as 
not being on a level with those that are Christians in its esteem.”362 
 
358.  5 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012).  Christmas was first declared a national holiday in 1870.  
Act of June 28, 1870, ch. 167, 16 Stat. 168. 
359.  See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (stating that “the monument’s 40-year history on the Texas state grounds 
indicates” that the state intended “the latter, nonreligious aspects of the tablets’ message to 
predominate”); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 38 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he ‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice is relevant because it 
provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged 
governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion.” (quoting Cnty. of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment))). 
360.  Letter from James Madison to Jesse Jones and Others (June 3, 1811), in 3 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 323, 323 (J.C.A. Stagg ed., 1996).  This 
letter was written by Madison, explaining his veto of a law that would have transferred 
federal land to the Baptist Church, in violation of Madison’s understanding of the 
Establishment Clause.  See 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 1097–98 (1811). 
361.  William Tennent, Speech on the Dissenting Petition (Jan. 11, 1777), reprinted in 
Newton B. Jones, Writings of the Reverend William Tennent, 1740–1777 (pt. 2), 61 S.C. HIST. 
MAG. 189, 196, 202 (1960). 
362.  Id. at 202.  Tennent was not prepared, however, to show the same solicitude to 
Catholics and other non-Protestants.  He approved of the eventual state establishment of 
“[t]he Christian Protestant religion” because “not one sect of Christians in preference to all 
others, but Christianity itself is the established religion of the state.”  S.C. CONST. of 1778, 
art. 38, in THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 137, 144 (Thomas Cooper ed., 
Columbia, A.S. Johnston 1836); Tennent, supra note 361, at 203. 
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Accordingly, the Framers decided that the American government 
should not acknowledge religion in a way that favored any particular 
creed, denomination, or group of denominations.  But they did not 
believe that all religious governmental speech was inconsistent with that 
goal.  Some commentators have dismissed the use of public religious 
language by Jefferson and Madison as instances where they simply 
“diverged from principle” or where, as Justice David Souter succinctly 
stated, “Homer nodded.”363  In reality, they, like George Washington, 
consciously refused to eliminate religious expression from their public 
speeches. 
All three realized that they needed to find terminology that 
permitted them to express reverential concepts without implying that 
those not of a favored faith were second-class citizens.  They strove to 
avoid any action that, in the words of Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance, “degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those 
whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative 
authority.”364 
Thus, they did use genuine, devout governmental religious speech, 
but only with the most general, non-sectarian references to God.  Their 
use of theologically equivocal language permitted them to communicate 
with a diverse nation, encompassing all people, regardless of their faith. 
Some contemporary atheists and other nonbelievers might object to 
any governmental religious language, especially in light of the 
exclusionary use of so much modern public religious speech.  The 
Framers, however, did not consider people with such beliefs to be 
second-class citizens.  Not only was their individual liberty of conscience 
to be safeguarded, the federal Constitution’s prohibition of religious test 
oaths guaranteed that they were to be considered full members of the 
American body politic.  Moreover, the restricted nature of the 
Government’s religious vocabulary was broad enough, in Jefferson’s 
words, “to comprehend . . . the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and 
Mahometan, the Hindoo, and infidel of every denomination.”365 
Some people have questioned whether the practices and attitudes 
from the framing generation are truly “suited for the more religiously 
 
363.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 624 n.5 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring), corrected by 
Erratum, 535 U.S. II (2003). 
364.  Madison, supra note 237, at 302. 
365.  JEFFERSON, supra note 264, at 62. 
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pluralistic twenty-first century.”366  The American religious landscape is 
certainly far different from what it was two centuries ago.  A 2008 
survey revealed that “the United States is on the verge of becoming a 
minority Protestant country.”367  Protestants make up barely 51% of the 
American population.368  In a development that would have shocked the 
Framers, Catholics are the largest single American denomination, 
representing almost 24% of the nation.369  American religious pluralism 
now includes Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, 
Hindu, and many others, including the unaffiliated, atheists, and 
agnostics.370 
But it does not follow that because the “religious composition and 
habits of contemporary America are so radically different from those at 
the time of the founding that using the founding as a baseline is a non 
sequitur.”371  It is precisely because we are a pluralistic nation that the 
Framers’ understanding of religious liberty is so valuable.  Their 
example teaches us the importance of respecting religious differences.  
They showed that it is possible to protect individual freedom of 
conscience while utilizing inclusive public religious expression.  The 
framing generation also reminds us that, especially during times of 
distrust and antagonism, respect for our fellow citizens’ personal 
religious beliefs is a fundamental American value. 
 
366.  Steven K. Green, A “Spacious Conception”: Separationism as an Idea, 85 OR. L. 
REV. 443, 477 (2006). 
367.  PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
SURVEY—RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 5 (2008), available at 
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/05/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ET2H-WFG6. 
368.  Id. 
369.  Id. 
370.  According to the Pew Forum’s Landscape Survey, the following are the 
percentages for each American denomination:  26.3% Evangelical (including Baptists and 
Methodists, Pentecostals, Holiness, Adventists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Anglicans/ 
Episcopalians, Restorationists, Congregationalists, Reformed, and Anabaptists “in the 
Evangelical Tradition”); 23.9% Catholic; 18.1% Mainstream Protestant (which includes 
“mainline” Baptists and Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Anglicans/Episcopalians, 
Restorationists, Congregationalists, Reformed, Anabaptists, and Friends); 6.9% Historically 
Black Churches (including the Baptist, Methodist, Nondenominational, and Pentecostal); 
1.7% Mormon; 1.7% Jewish; and 0.6% Muslim.  Buddhist, Hindu, Jehovah’s Witness, Other 
Christian, Orthodox, Wiccan, Native American, Pagan, and other world religions make up 
about 3.9% of the population, and “unaffiliated,” including atheism, agnosticism, and those 
reporting no religion, total 16.1%.  Id. at 12. 
371.  Epstein, supra note 19, at 2157. 
